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Natural Resources and Natural Law Part I: Prior Appropriation
Robert W. Adler*
Abstract
In recent years there has been a resurgence of civil disobedience over
public land policy in the West, sometimes characterized by armed
confrontations between ranchers and federal officials. This trend reflects
renewed assertions that applicable positive law violates the natural rights
(sometimes of purportedly divine origin) of ranchers and other land users,
particularly under the prior appropriation doctrine and grounded in Lockean
theories of property. At the same time, Native Americans and environmental
activists on the opposite side of the political-environmental spectrum have
also relied on civil disobedience to assert natural rights to a healthy
environment, based on public trust and other principles. This article explores
the legitimacy of natural law assertions that prior appropriation justifies
private property rights in federal grazing resources. A companion article will
evaluate the legitimacy of public trust and related assertions of natural law to
support environmental protection.
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I. Introduction
In recent years there has been a resurgence of civil disobedience to
support natural law-based arguments regarding public lands and other
resources. Some property rights advocates, particularly some western
ranchers, rely in part on a form of natural law that might be characterized as
rigidly prescriptive, and often theistic. Environmental advocates rely on
public trust principles with potential origins in natural law.
Both groups raise fundamental questions about the extent to which
land and other natural resources are public or private, their legitimate uses,
or the protections they deserve. Reconciling the validity of these claims is
deceptively difficult. Neither side can reject the claims of the other by
asserting the invalidity of natural law per se to interpret or fill in gaps in
positive law, without undercutting the validity of their own arguments.
This article focuses on the source and applicability of the prior
appropriation doctrine to support claims by some western ranchers to
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property rights in public grazing lands and resources.1 It does not challenge
the legitimacy of using civil disobedience to support those arguments. There
is a long and noble history in the United States of using civil disobedience to
protest government action or inaction, and to propose legal reform2 based on
alternative interpretations of law by discrete communities.3 There is an
important difference, however, between the legitimacy of civil disobedience
as a tactic to advocate reform, and the legitimacy of the reforms sought.
A. Resurgence of Civil Disobedience
When an Oregon jury acquitted defendants in a federal prosecution
for alleged offenses related to the armed occupation of the Malheur National
Wildlife Refuge, defendant Shawna Cox proclaimed triumphantly that “we
have God-given rights”4 and “… I pray that [people] understand that God
gives us rights, not the government. The government doesn’t have any

1

In a future article, I will evaluate the source and application of the public trust doctrine
to support a range of new environmental protections.
2
See, generally, See Bruce Ledewitz, Civil Disobedience, Injunctions, and the First
Amendment, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 67, 141 (1990). There is, of course, a difference between
nonviolent protest and the use of firearms, but that is also not my topic.
3
See Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 50-53 (1983)
(identifying willingness to endure the consequences of civil disobedience as a measure of
commitment to alternative legal interpretations formed by discrete communities).
4
Sophie June, Bundy Supporters Celebrate with Shofar Performance, WILLAMETTE
WEEK (Oct. 27, 2016), http://www.wweek.com/news/2016/10/27/bundy-supporterscelebrate-acquittal-with-a-shofar-performance/. See, also, Leah Sottile, Jury Acquits Ammon
Bundy, Six Others for Standoff at Oregon Wildlife Refuge, THE WASH. POST (Oct. 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/10/27/jury-acquits-leaders-ofarmed-takeover-of-the-oregon-wildlife-refuge-of-federal-conspiracycharges/?utm_term=.a153d1ddf745 (reporting Ms. Cox to have said “Wake up America, and
help us restore the Constitution.”)
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rights.”5 Her proclamation mirrors the views of ranchers in Nevada and
elsewhere who dispute the validity of federal land control.6
Although the Malheur verdict might be explained as jury
nullification,7 the argument that one can overcome violations of federal
criminal statutes by proclaiming God-given rights, or some other form of
fundamental law, cannot be dismissed as the views of one lay defendant.
Some Malheur defendants were convicted in a separate trial,8 but a jury also
acquitted some defendants prosecuted for the armed standoff with federal

5
Matthew Piper, Jury Finds Defendants Not Guilty in Oregon Standoff, THE SALT LAKE
TRIBUNE (Oct. 27, 2016), http://www.sltrib.com/home/4515803-155/jury-finds-defendantsnot-guilty-of. Ms. Cox was also seen praying with Utah State Senator Mike Noel before
willfully violating federal restrictions on motorized vehicle use through federal land. See
Christopher Smart, Mike Noel Warned Utah Woman Arrested in Oregon Standoff Not to Go,
THE SALT LAKE TRIB. (Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.sltrib.com/home/3467893-155/kanabwoman-arrested-in-oregon-standoff.
6
"Cliven Bundy says he doesn’t recognize federal authority over public land where he
said his family grazed cattle since the early 1900s. His dispute echoes a nearly half-century
fight over public lands involving ranchers in Nevada and the West, where the federal
government controls vast expanses of land.” Ken Ritter, 2 in Nevada Standoff Case Take
Plea Deals, Avoid 3rd Trial, THE SALT LAKE TRIB., (Oct. 25,
2017), http://www.sltrib.com/news/2017/10/24/2-in-nevada-standoff-case-take-plea-dealsavoid-3rd-trial/.
7
See generally, Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81 MINN.
L. REV. 1149, 1150-52, 1160-1163 (1997) (defining jury nullification as “a jury’s ability to
acquit a criminal defendant despite finding facts that leave no reasonable doubt about
violation of a criminal statute,” and challenging the notion that nullification presumptively
poses a threat to the rule of law). In the Malheur case, the defendants argued that they were
merely protesting government overreach and posed no threat to government employees or
the public. See Courtney Sherwood and Kirk Johnson, Bundy Brothers Acquitted in
Takeover of Oregon Wildlife Refuge, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/28/us/bundy-brothers-acquitted -in-takeover-of-oregonwildlife-refuge.html.
8
See Maxine Bernstein, Two Convicted and Two Acquitted of Conspiracy in Oregon
Occupation
Trial,
THE
OREGONIAN/OREGON
LIVE,
(Mar.
11,
2017),
http://www.oregonlive.com/oregon-standoff/2017/03/oregon_occupation_trial.html.
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officials in Nevada9 that later led to the Malheur protest.10 Moreover, this
was not the first time that western ranchers have used disobeyed positive law
to protest or resist what they view as excessive federal control of their
livestock and grazing lands.11
At the other side of the political-environmental spectrum, advocates
have also resorted to civil disobedience recently to protest actions that may
contribute to climate change.12 Environmentalists hail judicial willingness to
consider that defense as “groundbreaking” and “precedent-setting.”13
B. Resurgence of Natural Law
Some ranchers cite natural law in various forms to claim vested

9

See Joshua Zaffos, The Bundy bust-up, High Country News, Mar. 8, 2015 (describing
2014 standoff between armed ranchers and federal law enforcement officials).
10
See Julie Turkewitz, No Guilty Verdicts in Bundy Ranch Standoff Trial, N.Y. TIMES,
(Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/22/us/bundy-trial-nevada-verdict.html.
11
See, e.g., Debora Donahue, Western Grazing: The Capture of Grass, Ground and
Government, 35 ENVTL. L. 721, 804-05 (2005) (quoting 2000 High Country News article
regarding retaking by ranchers of cattle seized by BLM officials for unpermitted grazing in
National Monument); Light v. U.S., 220 U.S. 523, 535 (1911) (describing rancher’s threat
to resist government effort to prevent illegal grazing); Chorunos v. United States, 193 F.2d
321, 323 (10th Cir. 1951) (describing open defiance of Range Manager’s order to keep
livestock off particular federal lands).
12
See, e.g., See Blake Nicholson, Activists on Trial Wants More Time for ‘Necessity’
Defense, ASSOCIATED PRESS, (Nov. 3rd 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/beststates/north-dakota/articles/2017-11-03/activist-on-trial-wants-more-time-for-necessitydefense (describing efforts by Standing Rock protester to invoke necessity defense to justify
civil disobedience); State of Minnesota v. Klapstein et al., Court File Nos. 15-Cr-16-413, 15Cr-16-414, 15-Cr-16-425, 15-Cr-16-25, Order and Memorandum (Oct. 17, 2017) (preserving
necessity defense in criminal trespass case involving public utility pipelines).
13
See Jessica Corbett, Victory for “Valve Turners” as Judge Allows “Necessity
Defense” for Climate Trial, COMMON DREAMS, OCT. 17, 2017, https://saltlaw.us7.listmanage.com/track/click?u=bb6cea7ee89de64cd84564715&id=a12de5f99c&e=c5edf65a8e.
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property rights in public lands,14 as do some lawyers who represent them15
(collectively, “natural law ranch advocates”16). Those claims also resonate
with the populist narrative of western rugged individualism depicted in
popular literature and film.17 That narrative might help explain the jury

14

See WAYNE HAGE, STORM OVER RANGELANDS, PRIVATE RIGHTS IN FEDERAL LANDS
81-86 (3rd ed. 1994) (linking alleged rights of western settlers to natural law theory); R.
MCGREGOR CAWLEY, FEDERAL LAND, WESTERN ANGER: T HE SAGEBRUSH REBELLION &
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 12-13, 118-19, 123-42 (1993) (dating calls for privatization of
federal lands to at least 1973, grounded in libertarian economic theory and political
philosophy); Nora Simon, Oregon Standoff: A Timeline of How the Confrontation Unfolded,
OR.
LIVE
(Jan.
2016),
http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwestnews/index.ssf/2016/01/oregon_standoff_a_timeline_of.html; Kevin Sullivan, In the
Nevada Desert, Bundy Family Warns of Another Standoff, THE WASH. POST (NOV. 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/2016/11/01/c45bdf4e-a04c-11e6-a44dcc2898cfab06_story.html?utm_term=.f7f3349495c0. Some ranchers signed, and others
considered signing, letters to the federal government denying federal authority to regulate
grazing on federal lands, and unilaterally revoking their own grazing permits. See Tay Wiles,
Malheur Occupation Impacts Linger Throughout the West, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Oct. 4,
2016 (describing New Mexico rancher Adrian Sewell’s letter, which he subsequently appears
to have withdrawn, and meetings at which Utah ranchers considered similar action). The
form letters, addressed to the Solicitor General of the United States, read: “I am a rancher in
______, ______ County in the State of _____. I am here by [sic] giving notice of termination
of all contracts between me and the Bureau of Land Management, and the National Forest
Service. I shall no longer require their help in managing my ranch nor help in any range
improvements. I shall take full responsibility of these myself.”
15
See Marc Stimpert, Counterpoint: Opportunities Lost and Opportunities Gained:
Separating Truth from Myth in the Western Ranching Debate, 36 ENVTL. L. 481, 484-88
(2006); Frank J. Fallen & Karen Budd-Fallen, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 505, 507-08 (1994).
16
It is difficult to know how many ranchers assert property rights to federal lands
through prior use, but I do not presume that these views are universal. Apparently, at least a
significant number of western ranchers share these views, but prefer anonymity. Michele
Straube, Former Director, Environmental Dispute Resolution Program, Wallace Stegner
Center for Land, Resources, and the Environment, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College
of Law, Personal Communication, July 21, 2017. Ms. Straube facilitated grazing
collaborations between ranchers, federal and state officials, and environmental groups for
many years. Other ranching representatives advocate balance between public and private
uses and values on public lands. See W. LAND OWNER’S ALL., Toward a Productive &
Healthy
West,
https://www.westernlandownersalliance.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/08/Toward-a-Healthy-and-Productive-West.pdf (undated statement
sponsored by the Western Landowners Alliance, the Family Farm Alliance, the Rural Voices
for Conservation Alliance, and Partners for Conservation, and signed by a large number of
western ranches).
17
See Donahue, supra note 11, at 722, 740, 769-74, 790-803 (2005) (identifying and
critiquing the “cowboy myth” as it relates to federal grazing policies); George Cameron
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verdicts in the Malheur and Nevada standoff cases18 in the face of significant
evidence supporting violations of federal law.19 Similarly, some
environmentalists argue that civil disobedience is necessary due to a failure
of positive law to prevent or mitigate climate change or other environmental
harms, relying on arguments that sound in natural law.20
Renewed reliance on natural law is not limited to the legal and policy
debate over public lands, climate change or other natural resources. Some
recent scholarship calls for the resurgence of natural law,21 and arguments
grounded in natural law pervade divisive aspects of the nation’s current
political discourse. It has been invoked by opponents of same-sex marriage,22

Coggins, Parthenia Blessing Evans and Margaret-Lindberg-Johnson, The Law of Public
Rangeland Management I: The Extent and Distribution of Federal Power, 13 ENVTL. L. 535,
539, 559 (1982) [hereinafter Public Land Management I] (alluding to “parochial attitudes in
the West” and “an antifederal attitude sometimes labeled ‘frontier individualism,’” and
noting rancher “pride in a certain frontier individualism, usually manifested as opposition to
all things federal except federal money”). But see, Stimpert, supra note 15, at 524-529
(defending the legitimacy of western ranching families, lifestyles and economies).
18
See Sottile, supra note 4 (quoting defense attorney’s assertion that the fact that
defendants possessed firearms on federal property is “as much a statement of [defendants’]
rural culture as a cowboy hat or a pair of jeans. I think the jury believed at the end of the day
that that’s why the guns were there.”)
19
In the Malheur prosecution, federal prosecutors produced significant physical
evidence that defendants illegally possessed and used firearms on federal property. See U.S.
Attorney’s Office, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (MAR. 3, 2016) https://www.justice.gov/usaonv/pr/fourteen-additional-defendants-charged-felony-crimes-related-2014-standoff-nevada.
In a later prosecution, however, a federal jury convicted four of the other participants on
felony conspiracy and other charges.
20
See infra Part IV.B.
21
See generally, R.H. Helmholz, Judicial Review and the Law of Nature, 39 OHIO
N.U.L. REV. 417 (2013); Hadley Arkes, A Natural Law Manifesto or an Appeal from the Old
Jurisprudence to the New, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1245 (2012); Daniel R. Heimbach,
Natural Law in the Public Square, 2 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 685 (2008); Kirk A. Kennedy,
Reaffirming the Natural Law Jurisprudence of Justice Clarence Thomas, 9 REGENT U. L.
REV. 33 (1997).
22
See Manya A. Brachear, Gay Marriage versus Natural Law, Catholic Leaders Take
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opponents of publicly required insurance for birth control,23 proponents of
the right to bear arms,24 and advocates for religious liberty.25 The belief that
religiously-based natural law can override positive law is seeing a widespread resurgence in ways that may also reflect changes in the U.S. political
climate, including the populist wave of supporters who elected President
Donald Trump.26 In its most extreme form, proponents of theologically
grounded natural law suggest that their obligation to obey civil law is
secondary to their religious beliefs.27 This is reminiscent of the divide among

Different Tack as State Lawmakers Near Action, CHI. TRIBUNE (Dec. 30, 2012),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-12-30/news/ct-met-gay-marriage-natural-law20121230_1_natural-law-natural-law-marriage-fairness-act (quoting Chicago Cardinal
Francis George as objecting that “Marriage comes to us from nature”).
23
See David Ingram, White House Fights Catholic Church Subpoena on Birth Control,
REUTERS (Apr. 5, 2013) (noting that “the Catholic Church teaches that artificial birth control
is sinful because it violates natural law”).
24
See Judge Andrew P. Napolitano, Guns and Freedom, FOXNEWS.COM (Jan. 10, 2013),
http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2013/01/10/guns-and-freedom.html (rooting the right to
bear arms in the Declaration of Independence and its invocation of “the ancient principles of
the natural law that have animated the Judeo-Christian tradition in the West”).
25
See Paula K. Gerrett, Kim Davis isn’t Fighting for Religious Freedom, HUFFINGTON
POST (Sept. 4, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paula-k-garrett/kim-davis-isntfighting-for-religious-freedom_b_8080008.html (arguing that the debate over Kentucky
County Clerk Kim Davis’s refusal to conduct gay marriages “isn’t actually about gay
marriage or religious freedom. The debate is over civil versus natural law, and it’s a debate
that we’ve engaged in throughout history. It is about the meaning of law in this country.
Indeed, it is about the very soul of democracy.”).
26
See David Leonhardt, Trump Flirts With Theocracy, THE N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2017)
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/opinion/trump-flirts-with-theocracy.html?_r=0;
Sarah Pulliam Bailey, Act of Faith, Photo Surfaces of Evangelical Pastors Laying Hands on
Trump in the Oval Office, Wash. Post, July 12, 2017, available at:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2017/07/12/photo-surfaces-ofevangelical-pastors-laying-hands-on-trump-in-the-oval-office/?utm_term=.b980df6019dc.
27
An organization called “DependenceonGod.com” published advertisements in major
daily newspapers proclaiming a “Declaration of Dependence Upon God and His Holy Bible,”
signed by Evangelical religious leaders, business owners, attorneys, and politicians. See Salt
Lake Tribune, Advertisement, Nov. 6, 2016, at A-17. The “Declaration” begins with the
same words as the Declaration of Independence and adds: “Since our Creator gave us these
rights, we declare that no government has the right to take them away. Among these rights
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Puritans in the Massachusetts Bay Colony, a debate one author asserts has
not yet been resolved in the United States.28
C. The Tension with Positive Law
As explained in detail in Part III, federal authority over public natural
resources rests on the positive law in the Property Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, statutes and regulations adopted pursuant to that authority, and
judicial decisions interpreting those texts.29 The Property Clause grants the
federal government plenary authority over its public lands.30 Federal courts
have upheld a significant body of federal statutes31 against challenges to their
scope and effect.32 Courts have rejected claims challenging the legitimacy of

is the right to exercise our Christian beliefs as put forth in God’s Holy Bible.” After
proclaiming that these include specific rights such as life beginning at conception, and
marriage as a union between one man and one woman, the document asserts the signatories’
“constitutional rights as Americans to follow these time honored Christian beliefs—[and to]
commit to conducting our churches, ministries, businesses, and personal lives in accordance
with our Christian faith and choose to obey God rather than man” (emphasis added).
28
See JOHN M. BARRY, ROGER WILLIAMS AND THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN SOUL;
CHURCH, STATE, AND THE BIRTH OF LIBERTY 151, 206-07 (2012) (describing the debate over
“the role of government in religion and of the reverse, the role of religion in the government”
as “a fissure in America, a fault line which would rive America all the way to the present”).
See also, JANE MAYER, DARK MONEY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE BILLIONAIRES BEHIND
THE RISE OF THE RADICAL RIGHT 230 (2016) (identifying Calvinist roots in extreme
libertarian market theories among those who “crusaded against abortion, homosexuality,
feminism, and modern science that conflicted with their teachings”).
29
U.S. CONST. art. IV, §3, cl. 2; see Public Rangeland Management I, supra note 17, at
569-72, 593-94.
30
See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 534 (1976); Light v. U.S., 220 U.S. 523,
536-37 (1911); Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 525-26 (1897).
31
See, e.g., FEDERAL LAND POLICY AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§1701
– 1787; NATIONAL PARKS SERVICE ORGANIC ACT, 54 U.S.C. 100101 et seq.; NATIONAL
WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM, 16 U.S.C. §668dd; NATIONAL FOREST MANAGEMENT ACT OF
1976, 16 U.S.C. §1600 et seq.
32
See, e.g., National Audubon Society, Inc. v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 854 (9th Cir. 2002)
(upholding federal authority over national wildlife refuges); Wyoming v. United States 279
F.3d 1214, 1228 (10th Cir. 2002) (same).
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federal regulation of grazing on federal land,33 or asserting private property
rights to those lands.34 Most recently, in a trespass action brought by the
federal government against a vocal natural law ranch advocate, the Ninth
Circuit held that existing water rights did not support an easement by
necessity to graze livestock on public lands without a permit.35
Natural law ranch advocates, however, seek to refute this seemingly
overwhelming body of positive law through arguments of three distinct kinds,
reflecting different variations of natural law theory. At one level, the theistic
rhetoric used by Ms. Cox and others suggests a version of natural law in
which religious precepts alone are sufficient to override human positive law.
That set of claims is most summarily refuted as inconsistent with basic

33
See McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353 (1922) (upholding conviction for
obstructing passage of competing grazing users over public land); Light v. U.S., 220 U.S.
523 (1911) (upholding injunction against grazing on federal forest reserve without required
permit); Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897) (upholding constitutionality of
Unlawful Enclosures Act); Diamond Rig Ranch, Inc. v. Morton, 531 F.2d 1397 (10th Cir.
1976) (upholding federal authority to revoke grazing permits for regulatory violations);
Chournos v. United States, 193 F.3d 321, 323 (10th Cir. 1952) (upholding requirement for
grazing permits and holding that a “livestock owner does not have the right to take matters
into his own hands and graze public lands without a permit”).
34
United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973) (rejecting argument that Fifth
Amendment required compensation for value of grazing permits, because permits were
revocable and conveyed no property rights); United States v. Cox, 190 F.2d 293 (10th Cir.
1951) (holding that jury could not, in determining just compensation for lands appropriated
for military purposes, consider value due to grazing permits); Osborne v. United States, 145
F.2d 892 (9th Cir. 1944) (holding that condemnation of ranch for military purposes did not
require compensation for value added by federal grazing permits, which were mere revocable
licenses).
35
United States v. Estate of Hage, 810 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2016). E. Wayne Hage, now
deceased, authored the book cited in note 14 supra, asserting rights to graze on public lands
based on natural law. His son, Wayne N. Hage, also refused to obtain grazing permits to use
public lands, and was also a defendant in the case.
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principles of separation of Church and State36 and with contemporary
American legal thought and method.
Viewed through a non-religious lens, however, natural law ranch
advocates also assert two additional layers of natural law arguments. First,
there is a strong component of strict constructionist constitutionalism in the
views expressed by the Bundy family and their allies, with an implication that
the Constitution guarantees ranchers certain inalienable rights to property and
economic liberty. Second, natural law ranch advocates argue that the right to
public grazing resources parallels the legal justification for the prior
appropriation doctrine in western water law,37 which arguably has groundings
in natural law.38 They assert that grazing resources are as essential as water
to western economies and ways of life, and therefore similarly subject to
natural rights of appropriation; and that ranchers and their forebears applied
their labor to grazing resources just as they did for water, justifying associated
property rights.39
36

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See generally, ROBERT W. ADLER, ROBIN K. CRAIG & NOAH D. HALL, MODERN
WATER LAW, PRIVATE PROPERTY, PUBLIC RIGHTS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONS 1,
87-92 (2013).
38
See infra Part III.
39
See Falen & Budd-Falen, supra note 15, at 507-08, 522-24; Stimpert, supra note 15 at
483-88, 494, Todd Macfarlane, A Realistic Assessment of Utah’s Role in the Current “Public
Lands” Debate, RANGEFIRE.US (Jan. 7, 2017), http://rangefire.us/2017/01/07/a-realisticassessment-of-utahs-role-in-the-public-lands-debate/. But see Donahue, supra note 11, at
723-31; Joseph M. Feller, What is Wrong with the BLM’s Management of Livestock Grazing
on the Public Lands?, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 555, 571-86 (1994); George Cameron Coggins &
Margaret Lindberg-Johnson, The Law of Public Rangeland Management II: The Commons
and the Taylor Act, 13 ENVTL. L. 1 passim (1982) [hereinafter Public Land Management II].
Professor Coggins and co-authors address the legitimacy of federal land ownership and
37
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appropriation doctrine and the legitimacy of the arguments made by natural
law ranch advocates. It begins in Part II with a brief review of natural law in
U.S. legal history, to place the arguments made by natural law ranch
advocates in context. This part also demonstrates that the first two lawyers of
natural law argument described above were never recognized widely in U.S.
Constitutional law, and have been rejected even if once part of the U.S. legal
tradition. Part III evaluates the prior appropriation inconsistency in more
detail, and suggests legitimate reasons why grazing on public lands have been
and should be treated differently from water resources, as a matter of both
positive law and consistent with natural law reasoning. Part IV concludes by
explaining how resolution of the prior appropriation issue leads inexorably to
a similar issue regarding the natural law basis for the public trust doctrine,
which will be addressed in a companion article.
II. Natural Law in U.S. Legal History
Natural law is the subject of an extensive literature40 dating to Greek
and Roman legal philosophers,41 and it is neither prudent nor necessary to

authority from a constitutional and statutory perspective, but they do not address the natural
law theories directly. Public Land Management I, supra note 17, at 568-77, 593-98.
40
For a collection of sources until the middle of the twentieth century, see Note, Natural
Law for Today’s Lawyers, 9 STAN. L. REV. 455 (1957).
41
See Arkes, supra note 21, at 1248 (dating natural law philosophy at least to Aristotle);
Heimbach, supra note 21, at 690-91 (discussing natural law philosophy of Plato, Aristotle,
and Cicero); Natural Law for Today’s Lawyers, supra note 40, at 459 n.7 (identifying roots
of natural law in Greece and Rome).
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attempt an exhaustive explanation here. Some background is essential,
however, to understand the potential role of different natural law theories in
ownership and control of public resources, and the propriety of relying on
natural law to advocate for changes in positive law. Subpart A provides a
primer on natural law and its history, with a focus on the three layers of claims
suggested by natural law ranch advocates. Subpart B distills from this
analysis some key principles relevant to the manner in which natural law and
positive law might apply to those claims.
A.

A Natural Law Primer

“Natural law” refers not to a single legal philosophy, but to a series
of theories of law that have evolved significantly over time.42 Although
competing schools of natural law can reflect very different philosophies of
what law is, and from where it derives, differences are also explained by the
social and political circumstances in which the theories arose.43
To the extent that natural law is united by a common idea, it is that
some form of “fundamental law” exists through which positive law adopted

42

See Robert P. George, Natural Law, The Constitution, and the Theory and Practice of
Judicial Review, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2269, 2269 (2001); Heimbach, supra note 21, at 688;
Albert W. Altschuler, From Blackstone to Holmes: The Revolt Against Natural Law, 36
PEPPERDINE L. REV. 491, 493 (2009); Natural Law for Today’s Lawyer, supra note 40, at
456-57 & n.2 (1957); David C. Bayne, S.J., The Supreme Court and the Natural Law, 1
DEPAUL L. REV. 216, 216 (1951-52).
43
See John S. Harbison, Hohfeld and Herefords: The Concept of Property and the Law
of the Range, 22 N.M. LAW REV. 459, 461, 498 (1992) (arguing that all rights are
“historically contingent,” and that law “is the product of social forces and a carrier of cultural
meaning”).
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by political bodies can be derived and evaluated.44 The asserted source of that
fundamental law has varied considerably, however, from revealed religion to
human reason to a shared sense of morality within a polity. Thus, although
positive law and natural law could be seen as competing theories,45 the two
are not necessarily46 mutually exclusive. Under this view, positive law is the
means by which individual polities effectuate a society’s interpretation of
natural law,47 implement natural law given varying circumstances,48 or
address matters not implicated by natural law.49 Conversely, the legitimacy
or moral justness of positive law can be assessed by reference to natural law.
Legal positivism, by contrast suggests a sharp distinction between law and
morality to ensure fidelity to law independent of a judge’s (or anyone else’s)
views of morality.50

44
See, e.g., EVA H. HANKS, MICHAEL E. HERZ & STEVEN S. NEMERSON, ELEMENTS OF
LAW 477-78 (1994); George, supra note 42, at 2269; Natural Law for Today’s Lawyer, supra
note 40, at 457; Helmholtz, supra note 21, at 418; Louis W. Hensler III, A Modest Reading
of St. Thomas Aquinas on the Connection Between Natural Law and Human Law, 43
CREIGHTON L. REV. 153, 155 (2009).
45
Natural Law for Today’s Lawyer, supra note 40, at 474 (juxtaposing positive law and
natural law as “opposing schools of legal analysis”).
46
To those who advocate absolute, and particularly theistic versions of natural law, one
has an obligation to obey God’s commands even in the face of contrary positive law. Under
this view, natural law is not only necessary, but also sufficient, to create binding law even in
the absence of positive law.
47
For example, natural law might suggest that killing is not permissible, but societies
might differ in what constitutes self-defense, or whether the death penalty is justified.
48
For example, natural law might suggest that individuals must contribute to the general
welfare, but one jurisdiction might choose property taxes and another one might select sales
taxes.
49
For example, natural law may have nothing to say about procedures for registering
automobiles to ensure the orderly administration of traffic safety.
50
For the classic modern defense of legal positivism, see H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and
the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958) (explaining the evolution
of legal positivism from the theories of utilitarian theorists Bentham and Austin); H.L.A.
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Natural law in the medieval Catholic tradition

Despite the historical importance of Greek, Roman and earlier
Christian natural law philosophy, the medieval Catholic tradition is a logical
starting point51 because of its relevance to the theistic claims made by some
natural law ranch advocates and some contemporary scholars.52 St. Thomas
Aquinas and other Catholic scholars in the Middle Ages posited that God
handed down or “revealed” a set of fundamental moral precepts, such as the
Ten Commandments, that humans are bound to obey.53 Aquinas nonetheless
believed that natural law was accessible to humans because God implanted a
fundamental sense of morality into their hearts.54 Individual governments
might manifest those precepts differently through their positive law; but if
one believes these precepts come from deity, it is logical to view them as

HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1960); see also, R. George Wright, Is Natural Law Theory of
Any Use in Constitutional Interpretation?, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 463, 469-70 (quoting
John Hart Ely’s critique that “you can invoke natural law to support anything you want”);
Albert W. Alschuler, From Blackstone to Holmes: The Revolt Against Natural Law, 36
Pepp. L. Rev. 491, 496-97 (2009) (critiquing Justice Holmes’s view that natural law held no
legitimacy for law that must evolve constantly); Russell Kirk, Natural Law and the
Constitution of the United States, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035, 1046 (1994) (quoting
Justice Frankfurter’s legal realism view that natural law is nothing more than “what sensible
and right-minded men do every day”). At least in the context of constitutional interpretation,
however, Ely rejected the terminological distinction between “natural law” and “positivism”
in favor of a distinction between “interpretivism” and “noninterpretivism”. JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 1 (1980).
51
My goal here is not to provide a complete history of natural law theory.
52
Robert George, for example, retains the theistic view that positive law is “morally
good or bad—just or unjust—depending on its conformity to the standards of the ‘natural,’
(viz. moral) law that is no mere human creation.” George, supra note 42, at 2269. See also,
Helmholtz, supra note 21, at 417 (suggesting that natural law posits “a necessary connection
between law and morality” implanted by God in the hearts of people).
53
See Natural Law for Today’s Lawyer, supra note 40, at 475.
54
See Helmholtz, supra note 21, at 417.
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imperatives through which positive law must be judged.55
Thomastic natural law is very different, however, from a view of
revealed natural law in which individuals—as opposed to governments
through legitimate authority—may decide whether to obey positive law.56
The latter extreme view was asserted by some of the Malheur defendants,57
and also recently by a County Clerk in Kentucky who refused to exercise her
positive law responsibility to marry LGBT couples because it violated her
religious beliefs.58 One basic principle of natural law, however, is that,
because people are naturally inclined to live in ordered societies, and because
it is difficult for humans to agree on all applications of natural law, they must
respect the positive law of their societies until changed.59
This disclaimer in Thomastic (and later) theories of natural law is
perplexing in the context of civil disobedience, and has troubled those who,
at times in our history, believed aspects of positive law to be fundamentally

55

See Helmholtz, supra note 21, at 420-21. One of the debates that shook Puritan New
England, however, was whether civil government should play any role in enforcing the “first
table” of the Ten Commandments, those that define humans’ responsibility to God, as
opposed to those Commandments that implicate human conduct within civil society (such as
the prohibition against murder). See BARRY, supra note 28, at 206.
56
See supra note 27 (describing the “Declaration of Dependence Upon God and His
Holy Bible”).
57
See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
58
See Gerrett, supra note 25.
59
See Natural Law for Today’s Lawyers, supra note 40, at 480, 484; Kirk, supra note
50, at 1042-43 (arguing that it would be inconsistent with the “very existence of government”
and lead to anarchy to allow each individual free to disobey positive law); Lon Fuller,
American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century, A Review of Edwin W. Patterson’s
Jurisprudence, Men and Ideas of the Law, 6 J. LEGAL ED. 457, 468 (1954) (describing the
natural law “duty of obeying the positive law as founded on natural law itself [and] subject
to exception only in extreme cases”).
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immoral. The clearest example is slavery, which was affirmatively
sanctioned as a matter of positive law in the U.S. Constitution60 before
adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment.61 Radical abolitionists and some
judges found that positive law unconscionable, but others felt bound to obey
regardless of their individual moral views.62 This highlights the nature of civil
disobedience, in which one disobeys what one regards as an unjust law while
accepting the consequences of any resulting prosecution, as a means to
communicate disagreement and to precipitate change. Slavery, however,
may prove too much due to the clarity of the case ex post. Not every
disagreement with positive law is presumptively legitimate, and particularly
for issues in which there is widespread moral disagreement within society,
sanctioning disobedience with positive law based on every individual’s
personal views is anarchistic.63

60

U.S. CONST. art. I, §2, cl. 3 (distinguishing between “free” and “other” persons,
changed by the Fourteenth Amendment), art. IV, §2, cl. 3 (Fugitive Slave Clause, superseded
by Thirteenth Amendment)
61
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
62
In The Antelope, Chief Justice John Marshall proclaimed that slavery “is contrary to
the law of nature can scarcely be denied,” but held that one nation was not free to contravene
the positive law of another to enforce that precept. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66,
120-22 (1825). But see, United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F.Cas. 832, 846 (C.C.D. Mass.
1822) (Story, J. sitting as Circuit Justice, upholding federal government’s claim to seized
French slave trading vessel because slavery “is founded in a violation of some of the first
principles, which ought to govern nations. It is repugnant to the great principles of human
duty, the dictates of natural religion, the obligations of good faith and morality, and the
eternal maxims of social justice.”). For the classic explication, see ROBERT M. COVER,
JUSTICE ACCUSED, ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1984).
63
Robert Cover adopts a more nuanced view in the case of discrete communities (such
as the Amish and the Mennonites), whose alternative interpretations of law he asserted are
entitled to legitimacy in a pluralistic society, no less presumptively “valid” than those of
judges. See Cover, supra note 3 (passim). One could argue that natural law ranch advocates
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It makes sense that medieval Catholic theologians and legal scholars
during that profoundly religious period would propose a theory of natural law
rooted in absolute laws commanded by God. The Catholic Church was a
significant political as well as religious force, and competed with the coexistent feudal order to govern society.64 A religious philosophy that
promoted absolute obedience, in a society with weak state control, helped to
solidify the power of the Catholic Church. Where a dominant institution held
a monopoly in proclaiming God’s higher law, there was less risk that
multiplicity of interpretation would contribute to anarchy. Through
excommunication,65 the Inquisition,66 and other authority, the Church had
direct mechanisms to enforce its view of natural law.
2.

Natural Law in the Enlightenment

Enlightenment natural law theory is particularly relevant here because
of its influence on the early American legal philosophy67 on which natural

constitute such a community, whose internal normative worldview legitimizes their
alternative legal interpretations. I do not read Cover, however, to negate the legal force of
positive law and definitive interpretation and application by the courts in the face of such
alternative legal views.
64
See Philip S. Gorski, Historicizing the Secularization Debate: Church, State, and
Society in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe, Ca. 1300 to 1700, 65 AM. SOC. REV.
138, 140 (2000) (noting the dominance of the Church in Medieval society).
65
See, e.g., G.W. BERNARD, THE KING’S REFORMATION, HENRY VIII AND THE
REMAKING OF THE ENGLISH CHURCH 34 (2007) (describing potential for excommunication
of King Henry VIII over divorce from Anne Boleyn).
66
See generally, ELPHEGES VACANDARD, THE INQUISITION, A CRITICAL AND
HISTORICAL STUDY OF THE COERCIVE POWER OF THE CHURCH (1915) (examining the
Catholic Inquisition from the standpoint of morality, justice, and religion).
67
It is doubtful that there was a dominant, legal philosophy in Colonial America, as
opposed to a wide range of influences from which the Colonists drew and derived equally
varying views. See ELY, supra note 50, at 48-49.
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law ranch advocates rely. During the Enlightenment in Europe and Colonial
America, religiously derived natural law evolved into a theory positing that
moral principles to guide human laws can be derived from “right reason”
(rational thought) based on fundamental principles of human nature.68
Enlightenment philosophers still viewed natural law as universal, because it
was based on immutable characteristics of people and communities that
predated organized society, and therefore requires no state involvement for
its development or enforcement, leading to “pre-political” rights and duties.69
Most Enlightenment legal and political philosophers, however, retained a
religious foundation for natural law.70 That tradition inspired the political
leaders of the American Revolution71 to separate from England based on

68

See Arkes, supra note 21, at 1248 (rooting Enlightenment natural law in Kant’s theory
that all moral principles came from rational being); Helmholz, supra note 21, at 419-20
(tracing natural law roots in Europe from the twelfth through the nineteenth centuries);
Heimbach, supra note 21, at 694 (explaining Grotius’s view that natural law is the product
of “autonomous, non-regenerated human reason”), 694-95 (explaining role of Enlightenment
philosophers such as Hobbs and Rousseau, although claiming that the non-religious nature
of their work was responsible for the abuses of the French revolution); Diarmuid F.
O’Scannlain, The Natural Law in the American Tradition, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1513 (2011)
(identifying natural law as accessible to all humans through reason); Kennedy, supra note
21, at 44-47 (explaining Enlightenment natural law emphasis on “empiricism and
rationalism”).
69
Richard A. Epstein, How Spontaneous? How Regulated? The Evolution of Property
Rights Systems, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2341, 2342 (2015); see also, ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY,
STATE AND UTOPIA 10-25 (1974, revised ed. 2013); Natural Law for Today’s Lawyers, supra
note 40, at 461. .
70
Those writers included Protestants such as Grotius, Vattel and Pufendorf. See R. H.
Helmholz, The Law of Nature and the Early History of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. Pa. J.
Const. L. 401, 407 (2007); Kirk, supra note 50, at 1037 (discussing manner in which natural
law was “Protestantized” by Grotius and others); Heimbach, supra note 21, at 694
(contrasting Grotius’s view that morality could be derived from human reason but full
acceptance depended on belief in God, with Calvinist view that the only path to moral
righteousness was through God).
71
See Helmholz, supra note 21, at 421 n.30 (quoting Blackstone); O’Scannlain, supra
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“inalienable rights” endowed by their Creator.72
Enlightenment philosophy continued to suggest that any positive law
inconsistent with natural law was illegitimate or void. Notwithstanding the
more egalitarian idea that natural law was accessible to anyone through
human reason, however, this theory gave individuals no greater license to
decide what constituted binding law.73 Governments still dictated enforceable
rules through positive law, with judicial, legislative, and other mechanisms
to conform positive law to natural law when necessary.74 Enlightenment

note 68, at 1517 (noting Locke’s heavy influence on Jefferson); Heimbach, supra note 21, at
695 (discussing influence of Hobbes and Rousseau); Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the
Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1424 (1982) (linking the origins of a
private realm to the “natural rights liberalism of Locke”); Wright, supra note 50, at 473
(Locke); Kennedy, supra note 21, at 44-47 (discussing influence of Locke and Montesquieu
on Jefferson); Epstein, supra note 69, at 2346 (discussing Locke’s theories of property).
72
See infra Part II.B (discussing Declaration of Independence); HANKS ET AL., supra
note 44, at 479 (noting natural rights rhetoric dating to the Declaration of Independence);
Natural Law for Today’s Lawyers, supra note 40, at 487 (discussing the “founding father
approach” to natural law espoused by many Americans); Arkes, supra note 21, at 1246-48
(quoting James Wilson on the object of the Constitution to secure existing rights “we already
possess by nature”), 1255 (quoting Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist No. 31 and noting
as the “anchoring proposition of the American Republic, ‘all men are created equal’”); but
see, O’Scannlain, supra note 68, at 1514 (citing John Hart Ely’s view that the idea of natural
law in the Constitution was controversial, not widely accepted, and “not even the majority
view among” the framers); George, supra note 42, at 2269 (discussing Jefferson’s appeal to
natural rights in Declaration of Independence), 2276 (describing founders’ belief in natural
law as embodied in English common law); Kirk, supra note 50, at 1039 (describing
American political leaders at the time of the Constitutional Convention as Blackstone
disciples); Alschuler, supra note 50, at 491 (identifying Blackstone as “the principal teacher
of law to American lawyers of the revolutionary generation and the early republic).
73
See William Blackstone, COMMENTARIES 1:120-41 (1765), reprinted in THE
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, Vol. V, 388, 388 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987)
(“[E]very man, when he enters into society, gives up a part of his natural liberty, as the price
of so valuable a purchase; and, in consideration of receiving the advantages of mutual
commerce, obliges himself to conform to those laws, which the community has thought
proper to establish. And this species of legal obedience and conformity is infinitely more
desirable, than that wild and savage liberty which is sacrificed to obtain it.”)
74
See Helmholz, supra note 70, at 401-02.
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philosophers reinforced the principle that natural law requires obedience to
duly adopted positive law75 to guarantee that society functions to ensure
harmonious relations. Even in an extreme case—such as the American
Revolution—when a society determined that existing positive law so violated
“inalienable rights”76 that a radical change of government was justified,77
natural law demanded that they do so through legal means.78
Just as Catholic natural law reflected prevailing social, political and
other circumstances, Enlightenment natural law reflected the surrounding
political and social milieu. Nation-states competed against monarchs who
asserted the divine right to rule by fiat rather than reason.79 The argument that
individuals could deduce principles of law and morality through reason80

75

See JOHN LOCKE, THE TWO TREATISES ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT, BK. II, CH. 11, § 13436 (Dec. 1689) (arguing that legitimate laws passed by the consent of the people command
obedience); Steven Kautz, Liberty, Justice, and the Rule of Law, 11 Yale J.L. & Human. 435,
442-43 (1999) (arguing that the Enlightenment philosophers recognized that obedience to
legitimate positive law is necessary to obtain liberty).
76
See infra Part II.B (quoting Declaration of Independence).
77
See Fuller, supra note 59, at 468 (suggesting that the duty to obey positive law might
be subject to exception in “extreme cases”).
78
In the American Revolution, the Continental Congress was an official governmental
body even if it did not have the sanction of the English government. MERRILL JENSEN, THE
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, AN INTERPRETATION OF THE SOCIAL-CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 56 (1940) (describing the First Continental
Congress as being comprised of “the ambassadors of twelve distinct nations”). Contrast the
process that implemented the American Revolution from the mob rule that characterized the
French Revolution. See DAN EDELSTEIN, THE TERROR OF NATURAL RIGHT, REPUBLICANISM,
THE CULT OF NATURE, & THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 15-21 (describing use of natural law and
natural rights to justify the reign of terror during the French Revolution), 131-33 (comparing
French and American revolutions in treatment of dissidents) (2009).
79
See Horwitz, supra note 71, at 1423 (discussing tension between emergence of nationstates and notions of sovereignty in sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the philosophy
of natural rights to set limits on state power).
80
See William Blackstone, COMMENTARIES 1:120-41 (1765), reprinted in THE
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, Vol. V, 388, 388 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987)
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supported the rights of people to self-government.

3.

Natural law in the secular state

Beginning in the nineteenth century, much of Europe gradually
abandoned natural law in favor of secular systems of positive law reflected
in civil codes and other sources.81 Even in England, whose common law
heritage gave rise to the natural law philosophies of Locke, Blackstone and
Coke,82 utilitarian legal philosophers such as Austin and Bentham led a
positive law transition best reflected in modern times by the writings of
H.L.A. Hart.83
Natural law in the American Colonies, by contrast, initially retained
a religious tenor given the dominance of Protestant society.84 That philosophy

(asserting that absolute rights are “few and simple” but that people could derive secondary
rights that are “far more numerous and more complicated” from those fundamental rights).
81
See Natural Law for Today’s Lawyer, supra note 40, at 461.
82
See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
83
See Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, supra note 50; HART,
THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 50 (arguing that law was simply those rules dictated by
human polities with no necessary connection to morality). Led by the scholarly writings of
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, both theistic and Enlightenment versions of natural law
similarly lost their hold in the United States by the first half of the Twentieth Century. See
Horwitz, supra note 71, at 1426; infra Part II.C.
84
See, e.g., Samuel Adams, THE RIGHTS OF THE COLONISTS, Nov. 20, 1772, Writings
2:350-59, reprinted in THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, Vol. V, 394-96 (Phillip B. Kurland
& Ralph Lerner, eds. 1987) (discussing religious toleration for Protestants but not Catholics,
and describing the rights of the Colonists as Christians); Kirk, supra note 50, at 1038 -39
(noting that most of the thirteen Colonies adopted the Church of England as their official
religion, that the natural law teachings of Anglican preachers was “imparted from American
pulpits,” and that most of the Framers of the Constitution were Anglicans); Bayne, supra
note 42, at 217 (quoting James Otis in 1764 that natural rights were based on the
“unchangeable laws of God” to suggest that natural law was fundamental to “the entire
governmental philosophy of the United States from its conception”).
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became less tenable as the Colonies adopted principles of religious
tolerance,85 expressed ultimately in the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.86 Along with the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment,87 the Establishment Clause ensures religious liberty by
preventing the political or legal dominance in the United States of any faith
(or religion at all), but simultaneously limits the degree to which religious
text or philosophy—or any interpretation of religious texts—dictate
Constitutional interpretation or any other aspect of federal or state law.
Thus, although religion influenced early American jurists,88 the
rhetoric and justification for natural law adopted a secular grounding. Even
if they believed in natural rights endowed by a Creator, American proponents
of natural law89 argued that it was based on universally accepted moral
principles or legal maxims.90 As students of Blackstone,91 early American
jurists believed that natural law principles could be derived from a few,

85

See generally, BARRY, supra note 28.
U.S. CONST., amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion….”).
87
Id. (“Congress shall make no law … abridging the free exercise of” religion).
88
See Helmholz, supra note 70, at 401 (asserting that contemporary American lawyers
believed that principles of justice “were part of human nature, formed within us by God.
These principles were common to all men everywhere, they were immutable, and they
provided the necessary foundation of all human law.”).
89
See Kirk, supra note 50, at 1040 (distinguishing between Enlightenment doctrines of
natural rights and traditional doctrines of natural law).
90
See Arkes, supra note 21, at 1254-56. Hamilton used this logic (“the nature and reason
of the thing”) in The Federalist Papers. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 102, No. 81, at 122,
No. 82 at 132, No. 83 at 136, No. 84 at 155, 160 (Alexander Hamilton).
91
See supra note 71.
86
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fundamental, and commonly accepted natural rights of pre-political people.92
To be sure, religious natural law theories have continued in the United States
through the influence of Catholic93 and Evangelical94 legal scholars, but those
ideas have disappeared from formal legal decisions in the United States.95
Indeed, the most ardent legal positivists among the U.S. judiciary in recent
years include conservatives such as Justice Scalia and Judge Bork,96 whose
ideological views most likely align with advocates for natural law grounded
in religion.
The elimination of religion in natural law also prompted a shift in
which branches of government should determine how natural law influences
positive law. Judges in the religious natural law tradition were free to declare
void any law enacted through legislative, executive, or even monarchial

92

See supra note 69.
See, e.g., Bayne, supra note 42; Natural Law for Today’s Lawyer, supra note 40, at
473 (noting that natural law was “relegated” to Catholic law schools); John Hart Ely, Another
Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a World Where Courts Are No Different
from Legislatures, 77 VA. L. REV. 833, 848 (1991) (tracing Senator Joe Biden’s belief in
natural law to his Catholic upbringing); O’Scannlain, supra note 68, at 1514 (citing view of
natural law as parochial, and specifically Catholic); Hensler, supra note 44.
94
See, e.g., Heimbach, supra note 9, at 686 (discussing resurgence of interest in natural
law among evangelicals).
95
See infra Part II.C; Natural Law for Today’s Lawyer, supra note 50, at 473 (noting
that natural law was “banished” from judicial opinions and legal education in the late
nineteenth century); Heimbach, supra note 21, at 696 (decrying the rejection of religiouslybased natural law in the twentieth century); Kirk, supra note 50, at 1036 (citing the
prevalence of judicial positivism since 1938); Helmholz, supra note 70, at 402 (noting that
natural law “lost its hold on the common assumptions of most lawyers” by the end of the
nineteenth century).
96
See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 849 (1989);
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 20811 (1990).
93
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authority. Once natural law is stripped of its theistic force, societies may
adopt different governmental systems to decide which moral concepts should
govern positive law. As explained below,97 that is what the Framers of the
U.S. Constitution did in adopting a democratic republic. Elected branches of
government make policy determinations about positive law, for which they
are accountable through the electoral process. Judges are not free to invalidate
that law based solely on their own notions of natural law or other sources of
morality or policy, unless a statute violates constitutional requirements. The
federal and state constitutions became the “higher law” for purposes of
judicial review.98
This shift, however, did not eliminate the idea that some kind of
“fundamental law” necessarily plays a role in the legal process.99 Secular
versions of natural law maintain that law cannot be separated from morality,
but that morality need not be tied to religion.100 Lon Fuller, for example,
forged a procedural theory of law as morality (which he referred to as the
97

See infra Part II.B.
See generally, O’Scannlain, supra note 68; George, supra note 42; The Federalist No.
78 (Hamilton) (identifying a constitution as “a fundamental law,” to which judges must be
bound over all other sources of law).
99
The classic modern defense of natural law in the face of H.L.A. Hart’s ardent
positivism, see supra note 50 and accompanying text, was Lon Fuller, Positivism and
Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958), and later LON
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (revised ed. 1969). Earlier, Fuller had distinguished
between law based on state force and on moral imperatives. Fuller, supra note 59, at 457
(1954); Lon L. Fuller, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 2-15 (1940); see also, Kirk, supra note
50 at 1045-47 (arguing that the private interpretation of natural law should not be used to
settle conflicts, but that natural law should help form the judgments of lawmakers).
100
See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 21, at 39-40 (explaining that Fuller “still rejected he
providential origins of natural law”).
98
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“internal morality” of law) in which the legitimacy of positive law depends
on a series of moral precepts that ensure the legitimacy of positive law
without dictating its substantive content.101 Ronald Dworkin advocates that
law derives its legitimacy from “integrity”.102 John Hart Ely, who would
eliminate the positive law-natural law dichotomy from a terminological
perspective, rejects the unconstrained use of extrinsic sources (or a judge’s
own view of morality) to reach constitutional decisions, but believes it is
appropriate to interpret ambiguities and fill interstitial gaps in constitutional
text to ensure the integrity and inclusiveness of the political process and to
ensure equality, so that the democratic process through which substantive
judgments are made by elected officials is legitimate.103 Robert Cover goes
further, arguing that there is room for diverse sets of normative structures
(“nomos”) to be embraced by discrete communities, leading to alternative—
but equally valid—sets of legal interpretations.104 Some writers advocate a
more limited role for natural law, as an interpretive tool rather than a binding
rule of decision,105 or to be used only in extreme circumstances such as
slavery, genocide, or other patent human rights violations.106 This begs the

101

See FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW, supra note 99, at 33-94 (identifying those
precepts (in brief) as rules that are transparent, prospective, understandable, consistent,
attainable, consistent, and enforced fairly and evenhandedly).
102
See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).
103
See ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 50, at 87-88.
104
Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 3.
105
See O’Scannlain, supra note 68, at 1515, 1524-25 (arguing that natural law is useful
to help judges go beyond the constitutional text to understand its original meaning).
106
See Hensler, supra note 44, at 166 (advocating a limited role for natural law only
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question, of course, of what constitutes a sufficiently “extreme” case to
invoke natural law.
Others advocate a return to a jurisprudence in which jurists can rely
on natural law sources, some religious in origin,107 to safeguard fundamental
rights that predated the Constitution.108
Secular variations of natural law posited by U.S. legal scholars have
significant differences in focus, but reflect a common theme. They seek to
preserve the integrity of processes of law and democracy through which

when “absolutely essential to the human law’s more limited goal”); Wright, supra note 50,
at 486 (arguing that there must be cases, such as the legitimacy of slavery, where determinacy
is clear and preferable). Some assert that absolute faith in the dominance of positive law was
shaken by the horrors of fascism in World War II. Natural Law for Today’s Lawyer, supra
note 40, at 463 (also noting that Hitler meticulously observed the formalities of legal process,
came to power by constitutional means, and was elected by a plurality of the German people);
see also, Fuller, supra note 59, at 465 (noting that the Nazis “came to power through the
calculated exploitation of legal forms”). That experience likely explains the adoption in 1948
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.
Res. es. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948)(affirming the “equal and inalienable rights
of all members of the human family”), which could be viewed as an international statement
of positive law articulating those principles of human rights—or universally accepted moral
principles—to which all people are entitled regardless of the particular political environment
in which they reside.
107
See, e.g., Hensler, supra note 44, at 153 (referring to a revival of natural law tradition
for “at least the last two decades”); Kennedy, supra note 21, at 36, 39 (referring to a natural
law revival). The source and legitimacy of natural law was also a significant issue during the
confirmation hearing in the U.S. Senate for Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, and
the unsuccessful effort to confirm Judge Robert Bork. See Linda P. Campbell, Thomas Belief
in “Higher Law” at Center Stage, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 18, 1991),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1991-08-18/news/9103010246_1_natural-law-naturallaw-positive-law; Laurence H. Tribe, Clarence Thomas and ‘Natural Law’, THE N.Y. TIMES
(July 15, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/07/15/opinion/clarence-thomas-and-naturallaw.html.
108
Arkes, supra note 21, at 1254 (arguing that those sources “were usually not
mentioned in the text of the Constitution, because they were truths that had to be in place
before one could even have a constitution or a regime of law”); see also, Heimbach, supra
note 21; Kennedy, supra note 21 (approving of Justice Thomas’s implicit reliance on natural
law).
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elected branches of government make substantive policy decisions. They also
help to ensure equality and therefore equal participation in those processes,
without dictating the substance of those decisions by reference to moral
guideposts extrinsic to the Constitution or other positive law.
Moreover, even under a secular understanding of natural law, judges
rely on judgment to interpret and enforce statutory law where it is ambiguous
or has gaps, or to decide cases under common law where no statutory law
applies. In that sense, some scholars identify common law as a form of natural
law.109 Absent legislative or constitutional mandates, judges apply reason to
determine what rules best reflect and promote shared community norms.110
Similarly, the concept of equity, through which judges may relieve parties
from strict requirements of law, necessarily relies on recognized norms of
what is “fair” or “just”.111
The ability of judges to use natural law to influence decisions not
directly controlled by positive law, however, again does not allow an

109

See George, supra note 42, at 2276 (placing English common law as a “positive
embodiment of the natural law”); Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV.
14, 17-22 (1967) (explaining common law as a community of judges in shaping rules from
natural principles of justice); see also THOMAS LUND, THE CREATION OF THE COMMON LAW,
THE MEDIEVAL YEAR BOOKS DECIPHERED 17 (2015) (describing common law as a legal
process based on “reason and custom” in which judges are free to “alter general rules to
achieve justice in a particular case”).
110
See Dworkin, supra note 109, at 23-28 (citing as example that one should not be
allowed to profit from one’s own dishonesty; see also, Horwitz, supra note 71, at 1425 (citing
principle that equity will not enforce unfair contracts).
111
See THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining role of equity to
prevent absolute legal rules from generating “some undue and unconscionable advantage”).
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individual to disobey positive law based on religious or other personal beliefs.
Although the Supreme Court has struck positive law as a violation of an
individual’s right to free exercise of religion,112 that requires a judicial ruling,
not simply because positive law contravenes an individual’s personal
interpretation of natural law on other issues of public policy, such as the
relationship between private property and public natural resources.
Moreover, it has only occurred when positive law interfered directly with an
individual’s or a group’s exercise of their first amendment rights.113
B.

Natural Law in Formative U.S. Legal Documents

Advocates for a resurgence of substantive natural law rely in part on
the text of foundational U.S. legal documents and the Revolutionary concept
of divinely conveyed and therefore inalienable rights.114 The diminishing role

112
See, e.g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 448 (1938) (invalidating city
ordinance requiring individuals to obtain permit before distributing religious literature).
113
Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc’y of New York Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S.
150 (2002) (striking statute that required permit to engage in religious proselytizing,
anonymous political speech, and the distribution of handbill); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516 (1945)(invalidating statute requiring a permit before speaking to union organization).
114
See e.g., Arkes, supra note 21, at 1246-47 (arguing that the Constitution’s purpose
“was the securing of … natural rights,” citing The Federalist No. 84), 1254 (arguing that to
the extent natural law principles were not mentioned explicitly in the Constitution, it was
“because they were the truths that had to be in place before one could even have a constitution
or a regime of law”); O’Scannlain, supra note 68, at 1515-18 (arguing that natural law and
natural rights were “woven into the fabric of the Constitution”); Kennedy, supra note 21, at
34 (defending jurisprudence of Justice Clarence Thomas based on his “connectedness to both
the mind and spirit of the Framers of the Constitution”); George, supra note 42, at 2282
(expressing the softer view that the Constitution “embodies our founders’ belief in natural
law and natural rights,” as opposed to specific textual support); see also, Helmholz, supra
note 70, at 404-407 (comprehensively chronicling natural law principles in the writings of
the Constitutional framers). The most extreme version of this belief, and one that one
ordinarily would not think necessary to mention or refute in a scholarly law review article,
is the belief that Jesus Christ was the author of the U.S. Constitution. See Shadee Ashtari,
Tom DeLay Claims God ‘Wrote the Constitution’, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 2014),
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of theistic natural law in U.S. jurisprudence, however, began not with the
positivist school of law advocated by jurists and legal scholars in the early
twentieth century, as is sometimes claimed,115 but in the foundational legal
texts of the American Republic.116
The Declaration of Independence contains the most famous
Revolutionary-era reference to natural law. While attributing a divine source
to natural rights, however, the Declaration also highlights the critical role of
positive law:
WHEN in the course of human Events, it becomes necessary
for one people to dissolve the Political Bands which have connected
them with another, and to assume among the Powers of the Earth, the
separate and equal Station to which the Laws of Nature and of
Nature’s God entitle them, a decent Respect to the Opinions of
Mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel
them to the Separation.
We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit
of Happiness—That to secure these Rights, Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of
the Governed….117
The italicized portions signal ambivalence about the role of natural

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/20/tom-delay-god-constitution_n_4826503.html.
115
See Altschuler, supra note 42 at 492, (identifying Justice Holmes as the source of the
“revolt against natural law” in the late 19th and early 20th centuries).
116
See, e.g., Kirk, supra note 50, at 1039 (arguing that even though American political
leaders and jurists were Blackstone disciples, the Constitution was a “practical instrument of
government” rather than a “natural law document”); O’Scannlain, supra note 68, at 1514
(discussing Ely’s view that the idea of natural law in the Constitution “was not even the
majority view among those ‘framers’ we would be likely to think of first.”).
117
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
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law in the call for independence. By referencing “Laws of Nature and of
Nature’s God” and “endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights,” the Declaration identifies deity as the source of the rights asserted
by the Colonists. Some jurists and scholars cite these words as “Exhibit A”
in their case for renewal of substantive natural law.118 The phrases “Powers
of the Earth” and “decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind,” however,
reflect Enlightenment natural law doctrine that people, through established
governments, dictate how they should be governed, and by whom. The
second paragraph clarifies that people establish institutions to “secure these
Rights” through powers derived “from the Consent of the Governed.”
This suggests that the authors of the Declaration intended to break
from existing understanding of natural law and establish a government, as
later described by Lincoln, “of the people, by the people, for the people.”119
To justify independence, however, being bound by English positive law, they
needed to rely on authority other than English law. The Declaration’s reliance
on French Enlightenment political philosophy served a political purpose to
solicit French financial and military assistance.120

118

See, e.g., O’Scannlain, supra note 68, at 1516-17; Kennedy, supra note 21, at 50
(citing Clarence Thomas’s view that “the Constitution should be interpreted in a manner
consistent with the higher law principles made manifest in the Declaration of
Independence”).
119
Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, GETTYSBURG ADDRESS (Nov. 19,
1863).
120
See Kirk, supra note 50, at 1040 (asserting that Jefferson and others, as Francophiles,
adopted the rhetoric of Montesquieu and other French political philosophers to curry favor
with the French political establishment).
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Notably, once the Colonies declared independence, neither of the
formative U.S. legal documents that followed embraced natural law
significantly.121 The Articles of Confederation cites neither natural law nor
the “laws of God” as the source of substantive rights or principles of
government.122 The Constitution, in turn, begins with a Preamble that reads
even more clearly as positive law:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide
for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.123
The fact that the Preamble declares that the “People of the United States”
sought to adopt a Constitution to “secure the Blessings of Liberty” (emphasis
added), does suggest that the framers drafted the Constitution as positive law
to protect natural rights of people. This is consistent with the focus of the
Founders on natural rights, and “blessings” could reflect belief in a religious

121

Some proponents of religiously grounded natural law minimize the significance of
that change by asserting that the Declaration remains a “preamble to the preamble” to the
Constitution. See supra note 118. But see Kirk, supra note 50, at 1040 (rejecting the view
that the Declaration is a “preamble to the Constitution’s preamble” because “the Declaration
is not part and parcel of the Constitution”).
122
The only reference to deity, or other source of natural law, comes in the last
substantive paragraph of the Articles. That provision, however, invokes God not as a source
of law, but as inspiration to Colonial Legislatures to ratify the document: “And Whereas it
has pleased the Great Governor of the World to incline the hearts of the legislatures we
respectively represent in Congress, to approve of, and to authorize us to ratify the said
Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union.” ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, at
XIII.
123
U.S. CONST., Preamble (emphasis added).
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origin of those rights.124
Beyond the Preamble, nothing in the text of the Constitution,
including the Bill of Rights, invokes natural law or a theistic origin.125 That
is consistent with the Enlightenment view that positive law is the means by
which society interprets, implements and enforces natural law.126 Other
provisions, although traditionally interpreted for other purposes, reinforce the
dominance of positive law in the constitutional scheme.127 Even the Bill of

124

See Douglas S. Broyles, Have Justices Stevens and Kennedy Forged A New
Doctrine of Substantive Due Process? An Examination of McDonald v. City of Chicago
and United States v. Windsor, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 129, 155 (2013) (identifying
pronouncements by Jefferson, Adams, and Madison about religious origins of the rights the
American Revolution sought to protect). Broyles quotes Alexander Hamilton in his debate
with Samuel Seabury: “N]atural liberty is a gift of the beneficent Creator . . . . Civil liberty
is only natural liberty, modified and secured by the sanctions of civil society.” Alexander
Hamilton, The Farmer Refuted (1775), reprinted in 1 The Works of Alexander Hamilton in
Twelve Volumes 53, 87 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., Fed. ed. 1904). He also said, “The
principal aim of society is to protect individuals in the enjoyment of those absolute rights
which were vested in them by the immutable laws of nature, but which could not be
preserved in peace without that mutual assistance and intercourse which is gained by the
institution of friendly and social communities. Hence it follows, that the first and primary
end of human laws is to maintain and regulate these absolute rights of individuals.” Id
125
The introduction to the inscription uses the standard dating reference of the time “in
the Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and Eighty seven,” but otherwise the
document lacks any reference to deity.
126
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
127
The Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, §2, primarily an instrument of
federalism, see Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 Va. L. Rev. 225, 233-237 (2000), suggests
that the only source of law through which judges may invalidate legislation is the
Constitution. See The Federalist No. 78 (Hamilton). Article VI, section 3 of the Constitution,
U.S. CONST. art. VI, §3, parallels the Establishment Clause in prohibiting any requirement
that a judge or other federal official be a member of any prescribed religion. It also confirms
that the law to which those officers are “bound by oath or affirmation” is the Constitution.
The “necessary and proper” clause, U.S. CONST. art. I. §8, cl.8, in addition to ensuring that
Congress has legislative authority to effectuate other powers, see McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. 316 (1819) (upholding congressional power to establish the Bank of the United
States as necessary and proper to effectuate express powers granted in the Constitution), is
an affirmative recognition of the positive law authority of Congress within those areas of law
granted to the federal government. That authority was reinforced in the implementing
provisions of the post-Civil War amendments. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, sec. 2, amend XIV,
sec. 5, amend. XV, sec. 2 (each authorizing Congress to enforce the rights guaranteed by
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Rights, which enumerates some “unalienable rights” proclaimed in the
Declaration,128 includes no express reference to natural law. The only
amendment in the original ten that possibly invokes natural law—and then
only by inference—is the Ninth, by reference to rights not otherwise
addressed in the Constitution.129 Although making no explicit reference to
natural law, that provision has led to modern debates about the legal source
and content of those rights.130
C.

Natural Law in U.S. Jurisprudence

Notwithstanding the affirmation of positive law by “we the people,”
natural law continued in U.S. jurisprudence long after ratification of the
Constitution.131 The two concepts were not presumptively inconsistent,
especially given the constitutional vision of a federal government with
enumerated powers132 and a federal judiciary with limited jurisdiction.133
States were free to allocate lawmaking authority in any manner consistent

those amendments “by appropriate legislation”).
128
See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
129
“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
130
See infra Part II.C.
131
See Charles Grove Haines, The Law of Nature in State and Federal Judicial
Decisions, 25 YALE L. J. 617 (1915-1916) (collecting and analyzing federal and state cases);
Helmholz, supra note 21, at 424-34 (analyzing cases thematically); Bayne, supra note 42
(passim) (collecting and analyzing U.S. Supreme Court cases); Natural Law for Today’s
Lawyer, supra note 40, at 494-511 (analyzing cases in various areas of law).
132
See Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Mass., 197 U.S. 11, 12 (1905) (federal
government has no powers except those expressly conferred in the text of the Constitution,
or “properly implied therefrom”).
133
U.S. CONST., art. III.
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with the Constitution.134 This allowed state judges to develop nonconstitutional and non-statutory law based on precedent and judgment given
new circumstances. In the context of public resources, for example, courts
modified the natural flow doctrine of riparian rights into a “reasonable use”
approach that supported more intensive water use,135 replaced riparian rights
with prior appropriation in arid western states,136 and expanded the public
trust doctrine geographically137 and substantively.138
That common law tradition, however, did not dictate the sources of
law to decide new cases. Under natural law philosophy that prevailed into the
early Twentieth Century, judges believed in universal principles from which
they could deduce the “right” or “true” rule of law to apply in particular cases.
Early American lawyers were schooled in this method of legal analysis
through the writings of Blackstone, reinforced by American jurists such as
Kent and Story.139 Thus, nineteenth century state courts frequently cited

134

See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“whether the law of the state
shall be declared by its Legislature or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of
federal concern”).
135
See Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Evolution of Riparianism in the United States, 95
MARQ. L. REV. 53, 81 (2011) (noting that even early American riparian rights cases did not
apply natural flow doctrine absolutely); ADLER, CRAIG & HALL, supra note 37 at 46-47.
136
See Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (Colo. 1882); Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal.
140 (Cal. 1855); Epstein, supra note 69, at 2357; and see infra Part III.A.
137
See Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475 (Pa. 1810) (holding that English common law rule
limiting navigable rivers to those subject to the ebb and flow of the tide was not appropriate
to vastly different geography of Pennsylvania, with large, navigable inland rivers such as the
Susquehanna, Allegheny, Ohio, and Delaware).
138
See National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709
(Cal. 1983) (holding that public trust includes ecological values as well as traditional trust
purposes of commerce, navigation and fisheries).
139
See Kirk, supra note 50, at 1039; Alschuler, supra note 50, at 491; Helmholz, supra
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natural law to support their holdings.140 Federal judges remained free in
diversity cases to apply “universal” law to state cases rather than abiding by
state precedent.141 Analysts disagree, however, about the extent to which
natural law was the principal authority for a holding or simply reinforced or
explained the justness of positive law.142
To some degree, when judges reach common law decisions, whether
they use secular natural law in their reasoning is semantic.143 In his famous
proclamation of legal realism, Justice Holmes opined that “the life of the law
has not been logic; it has been experience.”144 But even more realistically,
common law judges determine whether existing precedent should apply, and

note 70, at 401-02; Bayne, supra note 42, at 218; see also, Smothers v. Gresham Transfer,
Inc., 23 P.3d 333, 340-45 (Or. 2001) (tracing natural law in the United States to writings of
Coke, Blackstone, Locke, and Kent, among others).
140
See, e.g., Billings v. Hall, 7 Cal. 1, 11 (Cal. 1857) (noting that natural law was “an
eternal rule to all men, binding upon legislatures as well as others”); Commercial Bank of
Natchez v. Chamber et al., 16 Miss. 9, 57 (Miss. Ct. App. 1847) (describing liberty and
property as “fundamental, sacred rights”); Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 21 (N.J.1821)
(grounding public trust ownership of common resources in “the law of nature, which is the
only true foundation of all social rights,” in addition to the civil law of Europe and the
common law of England); Fisher v. Patterson, 14 Ohio 418, 426 (Ohio 1846) (referring to
“sacred rights” to which everyone was entitled); In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232, 245 (Wis. 1875)
(declaring that admittance of women to the state bar was “treason against” the order of
nature).
141
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 12 (1842) (interpreting the Rules of Decision Act as
requiring federal judges to abide only by state statutory law in diversity cases, but not
decisions of state courts, and holding that the law regarding negotiable instruments is “not
the law of a single country only, but of the commercial world”).
142
See Helmholz, supra note 70, at 409 (quoting Justice Frankfurter as indicating that
natural law language in Justice John Marshall’s opinions was “not much more than literary
garniture”), 416 (arguing that natural law normally played a subsidiary role in cases to
support other sources of law, rather than to oppose them).
143
See Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 23 P.3d 333, 356 (Or. 2001) (finding that
“absolute rights” are those recognized by the common law as derived “from nature or reason
rather than solely from membership in civil society”).
144
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
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if so how, based on a combination of reason and experience, tempered by
what is fair or just under the circumstances.145 The same is true when existing
precedent offers insufficient guidance, must be modified to fit new
circumstances, or when judges invoke equity to temper an inappropriately
harsh result. Judges make such choices based on an understanding of human
nature and societal norms or moral principles frequently asserted as natural
law.
Judicial review of legislation, however, which Roscoe Pound referred
to as the American version of natural law,146 was more significant because of
its potential to substitute the moral judgment of individual judges for policy
decisions reached by an elected legislature. In Calder v. Bull,147 Justice
Iredell prevailed in the view that the Court could invalidate an ex post facto
law on constitutional grounds but not, as Justice Chase urged, because the
statute was “contrary to the great first principles of social contract.”148 In
Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote: “It is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”149

145

See Natural Law for Today’s Lawyer, supra note 40, at 494 (quoting Judge Robert
Wilkin’s view that judges decide cases based on “the ever-varying circumstances of life”
that “are part of man’s nature and cannot be separated from his life”).
146
ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 50-51 (rev. ed.
1954). See Natural Law for Today’s Lawyer, supra note 40, at 497.
147
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
148
Compare id. at 387 (opinion of Justice Chase); with id. at 399 (opinion of Justice
Iredell rejecting the idea that courts can invalidate legislation “merely because it is, in their
opinion, contrary to the principles of social justice”).
149
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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That pronouncement, however, referred to laws that violated the
Constitution,150 not a judge’s individual view of natural law.
The Supreme Court renewed its focus on natural law in the end of the
nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, during a pivotal period in
the development of prior appropriation and other natural resources law.151 In
substantive due process opinions by Justices Field, Harlan, Brewer, and
Sutherland,152 however, it did so in ways that challenged the boundaries of
natural law and jeopardized principles of separation of powers, most notably
in a series of cases culminating in Lochner v. New York.153 Those decisions
invalidated, based on alleged violations of economic liberty such as freedom
of contract, regulatory statutes adopted by federal and state legislatures.154
The Lochner-era Court sought to constitutionalize its holdings by arguing that
economic freedom was “part of the liberty of the individual protected by the

150

Id. at 178.
See infra Part III.A regarding the influence of natural law on prior appropriation.
152
See Bayne, supra note 42, at 228-233.
153
198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating state labor law setting maximum hours); see also,
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 86-87 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting based on the
“fundamental law of the country”); 111-24 (Bradley, J. dissenting, arguing that right to
choose profession is both a protected liberty interest and property right); Bradwell v. Illinois,
83 U.S. 130, 140-41 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring in the judgment, arguing that women
should not be admitted to law practice due to “natural” differences between the sexes as well
as “divine ordinance,” and that “[t]is is the law of the Creator”). ).
154
See David R. Driesen, Regulatory Reform: The New Lochnerism, 36 ENVTL. L. 603,
606, 612-14 (2006) (arguing that modern regulatory reformers share with the Lochner court
a reliance on “economic theory with natural law origins,” and that freedom of contract was
part of the liberty interest endowed by the Creator); Horwitz, supra note 71, at 1426 (“The
hostility to statutes expressed by nineteenth-century judges and legal thinkers reflected the
view that state regulation of private relations was a dangerous and unnatural public intrusion
into a system based on private rights.”).
151
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14th Amendment of the United States Constitution.”155 Dissenting jurists156
and legal scholars157 critiqued that practice as substituting the Court’s policy
preferences for those of elected legislators.
Federal judicial reliance on natural law persisted until the New Deal.
In Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,158 the Court ended the ability of federal judges
to decide diversity cases on grounds other than state statutory or judicial
precedent. Although also justified on statutory159 and constitutional160
grounds, Justice Brandeis pronounced the death of natural law as a source for
federal courts to decide state common law:
The doctrine rests on the assumption that there is a
“transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but
obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute,” that federal
courts have the power to use their judgment as to what rules of
common law are; and that in the federal courts “the parties are entitled
to an independent judgment on matters of general law[.]”161
Erie, however, applies only to federal judicial decisions in areas of law

155

Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53.
Id. at 74-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (objecting to use of the 14th amendment to
substitute the court’s economic policy preference for that of the legislature); see also, Tyson
& Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 445 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that state
legislative policy should not be disturbed absent violation of federal or state constitutions).
157
See supra Part II.A.3.
158
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
159
304 U.S. at 71-73 (holding that the Rules of Decision Act requires federal judges in
diversity cases to apply all state law, not only statutory law).
160
Id. at 78-80 (finding, arguably in dictum, that a different construction would
constitute an unconstitutional assumption of state lawmaking power by federal courts).
161
Id. at 79. Justice Brandeis cited an earlier dissent by Justice Holmes: “Law in the
sense in which courts speak of it today does not exist without some definite authority behind
it. The common law so far as it is enforced in a State, whether called common law or not, is
not the common law generally but the law of that State existing by the authority of that State
without regard to what it may have been in England or anywhere else ….” Kuhn v. Fairmont
Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
156
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reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment.162 Under the Supremacy
Clause, state positive law cannot override federal law with respect to powers
delegated to the federal government.163 What, then, suggests that natural law
has no legitimate role in issues of constitutional interpretation and other
federal law, including the use of federal lands?
Since the New Deal, most courts164 and many legal scholars,165
including conservative jurists,166 have asserted that natural law has been
supplanted by legal positivism. Federal courts may invalidate legislation only
on constitutional grounds,167 and the Court rejected the idea that natural law
principles of economic liberty supported constitutionally protected rights
absent a clear linkage to the text of the Constitution.168

162

U.S. CONST. amend. X.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 1.
164
See, e.g., Attar v. Attar, 181 N.Y.S.2d 265, 267 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958)(holding that the
role of a judge is not to determine when natural law is supreme over positive law, but to
adhere to and enforce positive law); Industrial Trust Co. v. Pendleton, 40 A.2d 849, 851 (R.I.
1945) (explaining that natural law rights are protected and enforced by positive law).
165
See, e.g., Natural Law for Today’s Lawyers, supra note 40, at 461-62 (claiming that
natural law was banished “first from our law schools and then from the language of court
opinions”); O’Scannlain, supra note 68, at 1514; Helmholz, supra note 70, at 402 (noting
that by the end of the nineteenth century, natural law “lost its hold on the common
assumptions of most lawyers”); see also, Caleb Nelson, A Critical Guide to Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 921, 923 (2013) (providing a typology of sources
of law before Erie, and critiquing the Erie decision).
166
See supra note 96.
167
See Helmholz, supra note 21, at 427-28; Wright, supra note 50, at 464 (arguing that,
in most cases, natural law theories are too indeterminate to control constitutional law
outcomes); George, supra note 42, at 2282 (arguing that judges lack authority to “go beyond
the text, structure, logic, and original understanding of the Constitution to invalidate
legislation that, in the opinion of judges, is contrary to natural justice,” and that the exercise
of such authority usurps legislative power).
168
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding minimum wage
law for women). As Chief Justice Hughes wrote: “The Constitution does not speak of
freedom of contract. It speaks of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due
163
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The second half of the twentieth and the early part of the twenty-first
century arguably saw a return of natural law reasoning, but for different
purposes. Some commentators argue that, after the horrors of World War II,
a U.S. Supreme Court that had become reluctant to impute economic liberty
into the fourteenth amendment169 became more aggressive in striking
legislation in the realm of civil rights.170 Cases such as Brown v. Board of
Education, however, were rooted in constitutional text and principles,171 or
in “the text, structure, logic, and original understanding of the
Constitution.”172 To avoid leaving substantive due process jurisprudence to
the “policy preferences of Members of this [Supreme] Court,” and because
“guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this uncharted area are scarce
and open-ended,” the Supreme Court has struggled to articulate principles to

process of law. In prohibiting that deprivation, the Constitution does not recognize an
absolute and uncontrollable liberty.” Id. at 391.
169
See Note, State Views on Economic Due Process: 1937-1953, 53 Colum. L. Rev.
827, 827-31 (1953) (tracing the rise and decline of the Supreme Court’s recognition of
economic liberty as a protected 14th amendment right).
170
See Natural Law for Today’s Lawyer, supra note 40, at 499; Risa L. Goluboff, The
Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Origins of Civil Rights, 50 Duke L.J. 1609, (2001);
1632-37; Jack B. Weintein, Procedural Reform as a Surrogate for Substantive Law Revision,
59 Brook. L. Rev. 827, 838 (1993)(discussing the success of procedural reforms in opening
the courts to civil rights claims); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Who is Responsible for the Stealth
Assault on Civil Rights, 114 Mich. L. Rev. 893, 904-05 (2016)(discussing the post-World
War II judicial shift from using the 14th amendment to address economic liberty to civil rights
and liberties).
171
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954)(grounding
decision in the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment); see also, Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954)(rooting challenge to D.C. segregated schools in the due process
clause of the 5th amendment).
172
George, supra note 42, at 2282.

42

Natural Law and Public Resources

[15-Feb-18

guide this inquiry without embracing the term “natural law.”173
The tension between natural law and constitutional law resurfaced in
what Professor George refers to as the “Griswold problem”174 regarding the
scope of residual rights protected by the Ninth Amendment. Although the
subject of ongoing dispute, some argue that natural law forms a key basis for
the constitutional right to privacy announced by the Supreme Court in
Griswold v. Connecticut,175 and a series of liberty interests recognized by the
Court in the wake of Griswold.176 In the diverse opinions in Griswold itself,177
the justices debated the extent to which the liberty interests protected in

173

See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (referring to “those
fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition’”, quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 503
(1977)); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 65 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring,
invoking “those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of
English-speaking peoples”); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (Cardozo, J.,
speaking of “a principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as
to be ranked as fundamental” and “rights implicit in the scheme of ordered liberty”).
174
George, supra note 42, at 2270.
175
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding unconstitutional a
Connecticut law prohibiting the use of contraceptives even by married couples in the privacy
of their own bedrooms, and medical services prescribing and informing patients on the use
of contraceptives); see also, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending Griswold
to unmarried persons); Carey v. Population Services, Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (extending
Griswold to persons under 16 years of age).
176
See Harold R. Demoss Jr., An Unenumerated Right: Two Views on the Right of
Privacy, 40 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 249, 252 (2008); HANKS ET AL., supra note 44, at 477-78. See
infra Part II.C for a more detailed discussion of this debate.
177
Compare Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-86 (majority opinion by Justice Douglas
recognizing fundamental right to privacy that emanates from the principles in the Bill of
Rights) with id. at 486-89 (concurring opinion by Justices Goldberg, Brennan and Chief
Justice Warren supporting decision based on “fundamental” rights protected by the 9th
amendment even without express mention in constitutional text); id. at 499-502 (opinion by
Justice Harlan concurring in the judgment and suggesting that statute violated basic values
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty protected by the 14th amendment, quoting Palko v.
State of Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937); and id. at 507 et seq. (dissenting opinions
by Justices Black and Stewart accusing majority of a return to natural law principles in which
Justices were free to invalidate state laws based on personal beliefs and preferences).
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Griswold were manifestations of natural law,178 or were rooted in existing
rights, or “penumbras”179 of those rights, in the Constitution. That debate
expanded as the Court reviewed the constitutionality of state laws banning
homosexual relations between consenting adults,180 statutes banning
abortion,181 statutes restricting biracial marriage182 and same-sex marriage,183
statutes prohibiting assisted suicide,184 and others.185 In parallel with the
fourteenth amendment debate, scholars continue to dispute whether the Ninth
Amendment is an independent source of unenumerated rights, and whether
those rights can be identified by reference to natural law.186 Others advocate
a return to a jurisprudence in which jurists can rely on natural law sources,
some religious in origin,187 to safeguard fundamental rights that predated the

178

See also, Calvin R. Massey, The Natural Law Component of the Ninth Amendment,
61 U. of Cin. L. Rev. 49 (1992)(arguing that the one purpose of the ninth amendment, in
addition to constraining federal power, is a judicially enforceable source of natural rights.)
179
Although the primary definition of “penumbra” is “a space or partial illusion (as in
an eclipse) between the perfect shadow on all sides and the full light,” an alternate definition
is “a body of rights held to be guaranteed by implication in a civil constitution.” Penumbra,
Webster’s Dictionary, (online), (2017).
180
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565-66 (2003).
181
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1972).
182
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967).
183
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2589 (2015).
184
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-20 (1997).
185
See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942) (recognizing right to
procreate as one of the most fundamental rights of mankind); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 400-01 (1923) (recognizing parent’s fundamental right in raising children).
186
See, e.g., James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Natural Law and Natural Rights in
Constitutional Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2285 (2001) (critiquing George’s
analysis of the issue and arguing that natural law continues to provide “aspirational
principles” to guide constitutional interpretation); Massey, supra note 178 (arguing that the
Ninth Amendment is a source of unenumerated rights, and that those rights can be informed
by natural law).
187
See, e.g., Hensler, supra note 44, at 153 (referring to a revival of natural law tradition
for “at least the last two decades”); Kennedy, supra note 21, at 36, 39 (referring to a natural
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Constitution.188
D. Conclusion
Based on this brief review of natural law, three principles are relevant
to this analysis. First, natural law has never been a fixed concept. It has shifted
as relevant to time, place and circumstance, from its modern roots in medieval
Europe, to its transformation during the Enlightenment, to its modification in
the secular state. Thus, to the extent that natural law is relevant to debates
over ownership and use of public natural resources, it must be analyzed and
applied in our current political and social context, not through the lens of a
past era.
Second, a basic tenet of natural law is that individuals must respect
and obey the positive law of the society in which they live, because that is the
foundation on which all civil society is based. Even the most ardent natural
law advocates have accepted that positive law is the means through which
governments effectuate and enforces rules for an orderly society, whether or
not the substance of those rules is grounded in natural law. Even those who
advocate for changes in positive law because they violate natural law

law revival). The source and legitimacy of natural law was also a significant issue during the
confirmation hearing for Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, and the unsuccessful
effort to confirm Judge Robert Bork. See Campbell, supra note 107; Tribe, supra note 107.
188
Arkes, supra note 21, at 1254 (arguing that those sources “were usually not
mentioned in the text of the Constitution, because they were truths that had to be in place
before one could even have a constitution or a regime of law”); see also, Heimbach, supra
note 21; Kennedy, supra note 21 (approving of Justice Thomas’s implicit reliance on natural
law).
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(including basic human rights) must do so through lawful means, or when
choosing civil disobedience as their method, must accept potential legal
consequences as the price of their chosen tactic.189
Third, the Founders omitted any reference to a religiously grounded
natural law in the text of the U.S. Constitution. Indeed, through both the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and the Oath or Affirmation
clause in Article IV, they prohibited the use of religion in adopting or
interpreting positive law. That left the federal and state constitutions as the
exclusive source of judicial review of duly adopted legislation, although it
left open the possibility that judges might rely on principles associated with
natural law in other contexts. Those may include common law matters or
other cases not directly addressed by legislation, cases that require judges to
interpret ambiguities or to fill gaps in legislation or constitutional provisions,
or cases in which equitable remedies may be appropriate even in the face of
legislation or other binding positive law. Scholars and jurists continue to
debate the precise manner and degree to which that interpretive flexibility is
legitimate or appropriate.

189
See Ledewitz, supra note 2, at 97 (citing City of Chicago v. King, 86 Ill. App. 2d 340,
230 N.E.2d 41 (1967) cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1028 (1969); Commonwealth v. Averill, 12
Mass. App. Ct. 260, 423 N.E.2d 6 (1981); People v. Alderson, 144 Misc. 2d 133, 147, 540
N.Y.S.2d 948, 958 (Crim. Ct. 1989); State v. Diener, 706 S.W.2d 582, 586 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986)). John Alan Cohan, Civil Disobedience and the Necessity Defense, 6 Pierce L. Rev.
111, 119 (2007) (recognizing that “[o]ne characteristic of civil disobedience is the
recognition by its practitioner that he must face the legal consequences of his offense.”).
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III. Prior Appropriation and Natural Law
A.

Defining the Problem
1. Natural law and prior appropriation in water law

The prior appropriation doctrine of western water law, in which
priority of right is assigned in the temporal order in which users divert and
put water to beneficial use,190 evolved in a period when natural law influenced
U.S. judicial philosophy.191 Prior appropriation reflected classic common law
process in which courts recognized that new circumstances justified different
legal rules. However, the doctrine was also root in natural law principles
regarding private property.
In Irwin v. Phillips, the seminal California case on prior
appropriation,192 downstream miners asserted, against owners of a canal used
by existing miners, the right to enjoy water in its free-flowing natural channel
under the common law of riparian rights.193 The downstream claimants were
not riparian landowners; they were squatters on the public domain, hence
trespassers. Thus, they had no valid claim to riparian rights, and the Court
could have dismissed the case based on prevailing common law. Instead, the

190

See generally, ADLER, CRAIG AND HALL, supra note 37, at 121-34.
See Eric T. Freyfogle, Lux v. Haggin and the Common Law Burdens of Modern Water
Law, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 485, 522 (1986).
192
Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (Cal. 1855).
193
Id. at 145.
191
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Court reached the same result, upholding the canal owners’ diversion rights,
through two related concepts.
First, the Court affirmed that the “right” of miners to prospect for gold
on public land was recognized under the custom of the region absent action
by the federal government—which owned the public domain194—to prevent
them from doing so.195 The opinion did not specify the source of this “right”,
but noted that both parties were equally situated in their status as users of
public lands. The right cannot have been rooted in positive property law,
under which the miners were trespassers. The natural law rationale for
allowing squatting on public lands, however, stemmed from John Locke’s
“homestead” principle. Under Locke’s theory, individuals have a natural
right to acquire property by combining their labor with unassigned resources,
so long as enough remains in quantity and quality for others to enjoy similar
rights.196 The necessary corollary is that the federal government, in “owning”

194

Unreserved federal lands were referred to as the “public domain” until the 1930s,
when President Franklin Roosevelt withdrew them from entry following passage of the
Taylor Grazing Act. See Public Rangeland Management I, supra note 17, at 536, 541.
195
“They had the right to mine where they pleased throughout an extensive region ….”
Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 146 (Cal. 1855). All parties admitted that “the mining claims in
controversy and the lands through which the stream runs, and through which the canal passes,
are a part of the public domain, to which there is no claim of private proprietorship, and that
the miners have the right to dig for gold on the public lands was settled by this Court in the
case of Hicks et al. v. Bell et al. 3 Cal. 219.”
196
JOHN LOCKE, THE TWO TREATISES ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT, BK. II, CH. 5, § 27 (Dec.
1689) (“Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided … he hath
mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his
property. It being removed from the common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this
labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men; for this labour
being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what
that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good, left in common for
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public resources, held them for the benefit of private individuals for later
appropriation, and not as a proprietor.197
Second, the Court extended this natural right of appropriation to water
as well as minerals:
Courts are bound to take notice of the political and social condition
of the country…. In this State the larger part of the territory consists of
mineral lands, nearly the whole of which are the property of the public.
No right or intent of disposition of these lands has been shown either by
the United States or the State governments, and … a system has been
permitted to grow up by the voluntary action and assent of the population,
whose free and unrestrained occupation of the mineral region has been
tacitly assented to by the one government, and heartily encouraged by the
expressed legislative policy of the other. If there are … many things
connected with this system, which are crude and undigested, and subject
to fluctuation and dispute, there are still some which a universal sense of
necessity and propriety have so firmly fixed as that they have come to be
looked upon as having the force and effect of res judicata. … So fully
recognized have become these rights, that without any specific legislation
conferring, or confirming them, they are alluded to and spoken of in
various acts of the Legislature in the same manner as if they were rights
which had been vested by the most distinct will of the law makers ….198
The court thus recognized a “right” to appropriate public resources, based on
local custom and practice and justified by the “political and social condition
of the country,” without any prior positive legal authority.
The Colorado Supreme Court took a similar approach199 in Coffin v.

others.”).
197
But see Hicks v. Bell, 3 Cal. 219 (Cal. 1853) (holding the state owned gold and silver
just as the British Crown did, and that the federal government held lands in the same status
as private landowners, not in a sovereign capacity).
198
Phillips, 5 Cal. at 146 (Cal. 1855).
199
The law of prior appropriation in California and Colorado would later diverge, with
Colorado maintaining a “pure” system in which riparian rights were no longer recognized
for purposes of water use and allocation, and California retaining some aspects of both
doctrines. See Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255 (Cal. 1886).
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Left Hand Ditch,200 a dispute between a prior appropriator and a subsequent,
bona fide riparian landowner. Positive law in Colorado when the dispute
arose201 appeared to support riparian rights,202 although the Court
unconvincingly refuted that implication.203 More importantly, the Court held
that prior appropriation doctrine applied in Colorado, prior to and
notwithstanding existing positive law, as a fundamental right necessitated by
the arid conditions in the region:
The right to water in this country, by priority of appropriation
thereof, we think is, and has always been, the duty of the national and
state governments to protect. The right itself, and the obligation to
protect it, existed prior to legislation on the subject of irrigation.
….
We conclude … that the common law doctrine giving the
riparian owner a right to the flow of water in its natural channel upon
and over his lands, even though he makes no beneficial use thereof,
is inapplicable to Colorado. Imperative necessity, unknown in the
countries which give it birth, compels the recognition of another
doctrine in conflict therewith.204
200

6 Colo. 443 (Colo. 1882).
By the time the case reached the Colorado Supreme Court, Colorado had become a
state and adopted prior appropriation in its constitution. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
202
As reported by the Coffin Court, one portion of the applicable Territorial statutes
provided: “’All persons who claim, own or hold a possessory right to any land or area of land
… when those claims are on the bank, margin or neighborhood of any stream of water, creek
or river, shall be entitled to the use of the water … for the purposes of irrigation, and making
said claims available to the full extent of the soil, for agricultural purposes.’ Session Laws
1861, p. 67, §1.” 6 Colo. at 450. Another section of the Territorial statutes provided: “’Nor
shall the water of any stream be diverted from its original channel to the detriment of any
miner, millmen or others along the line of said stream, and there shall be at all times left
sufficient water in said stream for the use of miners and farmers along said stream.’ Latter
part of § 13, p. 48, Session Laws 1862.” Id. at 450-51. Both provisions appear to support the
prevailing doctrine in which those who hold riparian property are entitled to the use of the
stream, for legitimate purposes, unimpaired by those who seek to divert water from the
stream channel.
203
Id. at 451.
204
Id. at 446-47 (emphasis added); see also, id. at 446 (“But we think the [prior
201
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Although the Coffin court did not expressly invoke natural law, cases
on which it relied did so. In upholding an equitable interest in an easement
for a jointly constructed irrigation ditch to satisfy appropriative rights, Chief
Justice Thatcher wrote: “where the climatic conditions are such as exist in
Colorado, the right to convey water for irrigating purposes over land owned
by another is founded on the imperious law of nature, with reference to which
it must be presumed the government parts with its title.”205 In upholding an
unwritten easement for an irrigation ditch against a claim that it violated the
statute of frauds, however, the Court distinguished traditional natural law
applicable to human morals from a form of natural law tied more closely to
the law of nature:
The principles of the decalogue may be applied to the conduct
of men in every country and claim, but rules respecting the tenure of
property must yield to the physical laws of nature, whenever such
laws exert a controlling influence.
In a dry and thirsty land it is necessary to divert the waters of
streams from their natural channels, in order to obtain the fruits of the
soil, and this necessity is so universal and imperious that it claims the
recognition of the law.206
appropriation] doctrine has existed from the date of the earliest appropriations of water
within the boundaries of the state. The climate is dry, and the soil, when moistened only by
the usual rainfall, is arid and unproductive; except in a few favored sections, artificial
irrigation for agriculture is an absolute necessity.”)
205
Schilling v. Rominger, 4 Colo. 100, 109 (Colo. 1878) (Thatcher, C.J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
206
Yunker v. Nichols, 1 Colo. 551, 553 (1872), superseded by statute as stated in Stewart
v. Stevens, 10 Colo. 440 (1887); see also, id. at 555 (“When the lands of this territory were
derived from the general government, they were subject to the law of nature, which holds
them barren until awakened to fertility by nourishing streams of water, and the purchasers
could have no benefit from the grant without the right to irrigate them.”).
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Thus, both the California and Colorado courts treated water
appropriation as a pre-existing right, independent of positive law. The
rationale was based as much on human relationship to the natural world as on
universal aspects of human relations in what was in some respects a prepolitical society during western settlement. Whether this reflects a variation
on natural law, or common law in which courts modified positive law to fit
different geographic and hydrological conditions, is open to debate.
The U.S. Supreme Court invoked natural law more explicitly to
ascertain the rights of individuals to appropriate water from public lands. In
Broder v. Natoma Water & Mining Co.,207 Justice Brewer construed a federal
statute granting land rights to a railroad208 as recognizing a pre-existing right
to appropriate water from public lands:
It is the established doctrine of this court that rights of miners,
who had taken possession of mines and worked and developed them,
and the rights of persons who had constructed canals and ditches to
be used in mining operations for the purposes of agricultural
irrigation, in the region where such artificial use of the water was an
absolute necessity, are rights which the government had, by its
conduct, recognized and encouraged and was bound to protect, before
the passage of the [statute]. We are of the opinion that the [Act] was
rather a voluntary recognition of a pre-existing right of possession,
constituting a valid claim to its continued use, than the establishment

207

Broder v. Natoma Water & Mining Company, 101 U.S. 274 (1879).
The statute in question provided: “That whenever, by priority of possession, rights to
the use of water for mining, agricultural, manufacturing, or other purposes, have vested and
accrued, and the same are recognized and acknowledged by the local customs, laws, and the
decisions of courts, the possessors and owners of such vested rights shall be maintained and
protected in the same ….” Id. at 275 (quoting 14 Stat. 251 (emphasis added)).
208
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of a new one.209
Like the California and Colorado Supreme Courts, the Broder Court
did not specify the source of this pre-existing right, but it cited earlier
decisions that expressly invoked the language of Locke’s theory of natural
property rights. In Atchison v. Peterson, Justice Field wrote: “And he who
first connects his own labor with property thus situated and open to general
exploration, does, in natural justice, acquire a better right to its use and
enjoyment than others who have not given such labor.”210 Thus, like the
California and Colorado Supreme Courts, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized
“pre-existing rights” to build canals and ditches on public land, but more
expressly grounded in natural law. According to the Court, Congress merely
ratified those rights in subsequent positive law.
2. The analogy to grazing rights
Advocates of private grazing rights on public lands cite the same right
of appropriation as applies to water. Falen and Budd-Falen argued that
grazing preferences under the Taylor Grazing Act and laws applicable to

209

Id. at 276 (emphasis in original).
87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 507, 512 (1874) (affirming the applicability of prior appropriation
to miners in the arid west in contravention of the prevailing doctrine of riparian rights). See
also, Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 453, 459 (1878) (describing customary law of prior
appropriation in mining camps as “part of the miner’s nature … [h]e had given the honest
toil of his life to discover wealth…”); Forbes v. Gracey, 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 762, 765-66 (1876)
(Justice Miller affirming state right to tax minerals extracted from federal public domain
lands because they had become private property of “the man whose labor, capitol, and skill
has discovered and developed the mine and extracted the ore or other mineral product”);
Basey v. Gallagher, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 670, 681-82 (1874) (re-affirming holding and natural
law reasoning of Atchison).
210
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National Forest lands are a form of sub-fee property right entitled to Fifth
Amendment protection.211 Stimpert asserted that grazing permits are a form
of property entitled to procedural due process rights.212 Nelson suggested that
ongoing environmental problems could be resolved by clearer delineation of
property rights in public land grazing.213 Anderson and Hill argued that
contractual or other sanctioned property interests would enhance economic
efficiency of grazing resource use.214 Despite the differences, several
common themes run through the analysis.
First, they argue, just as settlers combined their labor with water for
beneficial use in mining, growing crops, and watering livestock, ranchers
grazed livestock on the public range before the federal government had a
significant presence in the region, similarly entitling them to property
rights.215 Whether they justify those rights under classical principles of

211

Falen and Budd-Falen, supra note 15, at 522-24.
Stimpert, supra note 15, at 509-17.
213
Robert H. Nelson, How to Reform Grazing Policy Creating Forage Rights on Federal
Rangelands, 8 Fordham Envtl. L. J. 645, passim (1997).
214
Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, Cowboys and Contracts, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 489
passim (2002).
215
See e.g., Anita P. Miller, America’s Public Lands: Legal Issues in the New War for
the West, 24 Urb. Law. 895, 898 & n.12 (1992) (explaining effort to link property rights to
graze to appropriative water rights, citing speech by rancher Wayne Hage); Stimpert, supra
note 15, at 485-89, 494-96 (arguing that same rules of appropriation should apply to forage
as to water and hard rock minerals); Falen and Budd-Falen, supra note 15, at 507-08, 52021 (asserting that grazing rights arose due to prior use later recognized in federal permits,
and citing 1905 report from meeting between Forest Service and stockmen asserting prior
appropriation and “law of occupancy” rights to graze); see also Harbison, supra note 43, at
466-67, 481 (arguing that courts have held erroneously that grazing permits and leases
convey no property interests because those permits convey many of the “sticks in the bundle”
of traditional property rights).
212
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natural law articulated by Aristotle, Locke and Blackstone,216 as a
manifestation of the rule of capture in property law,217 or even under Biblical
principles dating to Abraham’s well,218 natural law ranch advocates assert
property rights similar to those recognized in water.
Second, natural law ranch advocates argue that, just as western aridity
and geography necessitated prior appropriation of water, range conditions
made public land grazing imperative to the success of livestock operations in
the region, dating to Spanish Colonial and Mexican rule in the southwest.219
As grazing economies developed, federal homesteading programs allowed
settlers to acquire fee ownership, but only for parcels of limited size.220 Given
the acreage required to support cattle on western rangelands, an economically
feasible solution was to use the acquired land as “base property,” while using
much larger areas of federal land for supplemental grazing.221 Thus, they

216

See Nelson, supra note 213, at 645-47 (citing natural law theorists from Aristotle to
Aquinas and arguing that Locke’s theory of property may apply equally to grazing as to other
property, but that the same would be true for other public land uses as well); Stimpert, supra
note __, at 484-86 (citing Blackstone), 495-96 (questioning why ranchers “were not given
the full fruit of their labor”); Harbison, supra note 43, at 459-60 (quoting Adam Smith).
217
See Donahue, supra note 11, at 731-37 (explaining but not agreeing with validity of
analogy to rule of capture); Stimpert, supra note 15, at 485-87 (discussing prior appropriation
as logical outgrowth of the rule of capture, leading to property rights “as a common principle
of American property law”).
218
See Stimpert, supra note 15, at 484-85, 488 (arguing that property rights tied to labor
date back to Abraham’s well as recorded in the Bible).
219
See Law of Public Rangeland Management II, supra note 39, at 22; Falen and BuddFalen, supra note 15, at 512-28 (asserting that the federal government pledged to respect any
associated property rights in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo); Stimpert, supra note 15, at
489-90.
220
See Law of Public Rangeland Management II, supra note 39, at 16-22.
221
See id. at 22-30; Law of Public Rangeland Management I, supra note 17, at 541-43;
Donahue, supra note 11, at 735-36
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argue, just as prior appropriation was justified based on aridity and dispersed
surface waters compared to the riparian east, public land grazing was
necessitated by the lower productivity of western rangeland related to those
in lusher regions.
Third, natural law ranch advocates assert that these imperatives of the
western range led to customary practices that became—or should have
become—accepted doctrine and are as entitled to retrospective legal
recognition as was true for water.222
Why, then, should those resources be treated differently for purposes
of enforceable property rights? In Part B, I present several reasons why the
analogy is flawed, and why arguments posited on behalf of natural law ranch
advocates fundamentally misconstrue key principles of natural law identified
in the conclusion to Part II.
B.

Positive Law and Public Resources

Despite the surficial appeal of the prior appropriation analogy, it does
not support property rights to graze public lands. First, even if prior
appropriation water law had roots in natural law, it was later ratified through

222
See Falen and Budd-Falen, supra note 15, at 511-22 (tracing customary grazing
patterns and practices and their evolution into legally recognized grazing preferences);
Nelson, supra note 213, at 646-49 (arguing that customary grazing practices evolved into de
facto rights); Anderson and Hill, supra note 214, at 499-508 (arguing that customary range
rights later were recognized as property through local custom and later positive law);
Stimpert, supra note 15, at 488-96 (arguing that customary practices justified, but not achieve
adequate recognition of property rights to graze).

56

Natural Law and Public Resources

[15-Feb-18

positive law. By contrast, the federal government chose a different positive
law for grazing rights. Second, it is unclear whether prior appropriation is a
natural law or a positive law doctrine. Third, even if prior appropriation has
a natural law grounding, it must be applied consistent with natural law
principles.
1.

The intervention of positive law

The most straightforward way to refute the prior appropriation
analogy is the intervention of positive law, in which the federal government
adopted, through legislation and judicial interpretation, different policies
regarding the use of water and forage resources on public lands. The federal
government ceded most of its water claims to the states, leaving each state
free to adopt its own positive law governing water use and allocation. State
positive law largely embraced prior appropriation at the constitutional,
legislative and judicial levels. For grazing resources, Congress adopted a
different approach in the Taylor Grazing Act,223 the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act, 224 and other statutes and regulations.
a. Water rights
Although one could interpret the evolution of western water law as an
example of common law process, 225 for purposes of this section I assume that

223

Pub. L. No. 73-482, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. (1934) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 315, 316).
See, e.g., FEDERAL LAND POLICY AND MANAGEMENT ACT, 43 U.S.C. ch. 35.
225
See supra notes 143-145and accompanying text.
224
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early prior appropriation doctrine reflected natural law. Subsequent to
judicial recognition of pre-existing customs and practices in the cases
discussed above, however, western states embraced prior appropriation
through positive law, to varying degrees relative to continued applicability of
riparian rights. States did so via constitutional provisions,226 legislation,227
judicial action,228 or a combination of the above.
More important was the manner in which federal legislation and
judicial interpretations accepted state prior appropriation law. In California
Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co.,229 the U.S. Supreme
Court reaffirmed the natural law origins of prior appropriation, but also
embraced the role of positive law in codifying those rights. In California
Oregon Power Co., a riparian landowner argued that a federal land patent
issued pursuant to the Homestead Act230 incorporated riparian rights that
protected them against water use by an appropriator.231 The lower courts
agreed, but the U.S. Supreme Court reversed based on the reasoning in
Broder v. Natoma Water & Mining Co., Coffin v. Left hand Ditch, and Irwin
v. Phillips. The Court held that Congress, in authorizing federal land patents,
226

See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 5, 6; IDAHO CONST. art. XV, §3; UTAH CONST.
art. VII, § 1.
227
See, e.g., Utah Code ch. 73.
228
See, e.g., Irwin v. Phillip, 5 Cal. 140 (Cal. 1855); Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch, 6 Colo.
443 (Colo. 1882); Stowell v. Johnson, 26 P. 290 (1891); Moyer v. Preston, 44 P. 845 (Wyo.
1896).
229
California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
230
Act of May 20, 1862, 12 Stat. 392.
231
Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. at 151-53.
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acquiesced in water rights acknowledged by the western territories and states
based on appropriation of water and application to beneficial use, as accepted
by local custom and practice. 232
The Supreme Court went further in California Oregon Power Co.,
however, holding that Congress, in enacting section 1 of the Desert Lands
Act,233 affected “a severance of all waters upon the public domain, not
theretofore appropriated, from the land itself.”234 This was an immensely
consequential ruling. Under the Property Clause of the Constitution,235
Congress had plenary control over those lands, including their riparian water
rights. Under the Court’s interpretation of section 1 of the Desert Lands Act,
however, Congress relinquished its riparian water rights entirely, leaving the
nature of water rights—on federal, state, or private lands—to the discretion
of each state.236
The Supreme Court in California Oregon Power Co. retained the
reasoning in Broder that the Desert Lands Act merely recognized existing
appropriative rights.237 The Court quoted Broder for the proposition that all

232

Id. at 154.
“All surplus water over and above such actual appropriation and use, together with
the water of all lakes, rivers, and other sources of water supply upon the public lands and not
navigable, shall remain and be held free for the appropriation and use of the public for
irrigation, mining and manufacturing subject to existing rights.” Act of March 3, 1877, c.
107, § 1, 19 Stat. 377 (codified at 43 U.S.C. 321).
234
Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. at 158 (emphasis added).
235
U.S. CONST. art. IV, §3, cl. 2.
236
See Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. at 163-64.
237
Id. at 154 (“The rule generally recognized throughout the states and territories of the
arid region was that the acquisition of water by prior appropriation for a beneficial use was
233
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prior patents issued during this period were subject to this “existing
servitude.”238 Similarly, the Court invoked the California and Colorado
Supreme Courts’ reasoning in describing the nature of the land and the
essential labor deployed by settlers as justification for the holding. 239
The Supreme Court invoked positive law, however, to determine
whether Congress, in homestead statutes, acquiesced in the practice: “This
general policy was approved by the silent acquiescence of the federal
government, until it received formal confirmation at the hands of Congress
by the Act of 1866….”240 In extending the recognition to future patents, under
all federal land disposal statutes, the Court held: “If the acts of 1866 and 1870

entitled to protection; and the rule applied whether the water was diverted for manufacturing,
irrigation, or mining purposes. The rule was evidenced not alone by legislation and judicial
decision, but by local and customary law and usage as well.”)
238
Id. at 155.
239
Id. at 156-57 (“In the beginning, the task of reclaiming this area was left to the
unaided efforts of the people who found their way by painful effort to its inhospitable
solitudes. These western pioneers, emulating the spirit of so many others who had gone
before them in similar ventures, faced the difficult problem of wresting a living and creating
homes from the raw elements about them, and threw down the gage of battle to the forces of
nature. With imperfect tools, they built dams, excavated canals, constructed ditches, plowed
and cultivated the soil, and transformed dry and desolate lands into green fields and leafy
orchards.”) See also, id. at 158 (“… the future growth and well-being of the entire region
depended upon a complete adherence to the rule of appropriation for a beneficial use as the
exclusive criterion of the right to the use of water. The streams and other sources of supply
from which this water must come was separated from one another by wide stretches of
parched and barren land which never could be made to produce agricultural crops except by
the transmission of water for long distances and its entire consumption in the processes of
irrigation. Necessarily, that involved the complete subordination of the common-law
doctrine of riparian rights to that of appropriation.”)
240
Id. The applicable section of the Mining Law of 1866 provided: “Whenever, by
priority of possession, rights to the use of water for mining, agricultural, manufacturing, or
other purposes, have vested and accrued, and the same are recognized and acknowledged by
the local customs, laws, and the decisions of courts, the possessors and owners of such vested
rights shall be maintained and protected in the same; ….” Id. at 154-55.
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did not constitute an entire abandonment of the common-law rule of running
waters in so far as the public lands and subsequent grantees therefore were
concerned, they foreshadowed the more positive declarations of the Desert
Land Act of 1877, which it is contended did bring about that result.”241
Moreover, to the extent that Justice Sutherland242 cited arid western
conditions and the extreme efforts necessary to wrest a living from those
lands through hard labor and capital investment, he did so as an interpretive
tool to ascertain the intent of Congress in adopting the Desert Land Act. He
did not assert (as was true in Broder243) that the right of appropriation arose
under natural law, and therefore, was something Congress was obligated to
accept.244
The Court also adopted a positive law approach in its second major
holding in California Oregon Power Co., that in enacting section 1 of the
Desert Land Act, Congress ceded governmental authority over water rights
(in addition to federal ownership) to the states. Although the Court discussed
arid western conditions to explain congressional abandonment of riparian

241

Id.; see also, id. at 159-63 (discussing authority of federal government to consent to
the severance of water from the public domain, and intent to do so through legislation).
242
Justice Sutherland came from Utah, a prior appropriation state.
243
See supra at note 207 and accompanying text.
244
See Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. at 156 (“For the light which it will reflect
upon the meaning and scope of that provision [of the Desert Land Act] and its bearing upon
the present question, it is well to pause at this point to consider the then existing situation
with respect to the land and water rights in the states and territories named.”); 158 (“In the
light of the foregoing considerations, the Desert Land Act was passed, and in their light it
must now be construed.”)

15-Feb-18]

Natural Law and Public Resources

61

rights, congressional severance of water from the public domain left each
state free to adopt water law suitable to its circumstances. 245 In the federal
reserved water rights doctrine, the federal government later reinforced the
concept that it was, through positive law, making affirmative policy decisions
about the degree to which water would be available for appropriation by
private individuals. Although adopted by judicial decision rather than
legislation, this doctrine held that the federal government, in reserving lands
for specified uses, impliedly reserved sufficient water for the purposes of the
reservation.246
Thus, the evolution of water law from the late eighteenth to the early
nineteenth centuries reflected a classic evolution from natural law to positive
law reasoning. Appropriative rights may have been based initially on Locke’s
theory of property or reflected local “custom and practice,” but states retained
those rights as a deliberate policy choice through judicial or legislative
decisions. Likewise, federal courts held that Congress ceded control over

245

Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. at 162 (holding that the effect of severing
water from the public lands was “that all nonnavigable waters thereon shall be reserved for
the use of the public under the laws of the states and territories named”); 163 (clarifying that
the Court’s holding does not have “the effect of curtailing the power of the states affected to
legislate in respect of waters and water rights as they deem wise in the public interest”); 164
(upholding “the right in each [state] to determine for itself to what extent the rule of
appropriation or the common-law rule in respect of riparian rights should obtain.”). This
explains the many variations of prior appropriation, and mixtures of appropriative and
riparian rights, in different western states. See ADLER, CRAIG AND HALL, supra note 37, at
87-109.
246
See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) (holding that the United States, in
creating Indian Reservations, impliedly reserved sufficient water for the resident Tribes to
live on that land).
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water rights on public lands as a conscious policy choice.
b.

Grazing rights

During the cattle boom of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, federal public lands not reserved for specific purposes were
available for use by ranchers and others.247 Those lands remained open for
grazing according to local custom and practice, with the tacit consent of the
federal government,248 before they were withdrawn from the public domain
and reserved for particular purposes.249 Just as courts justified prior
appropriation based on arid western conditions, they explained the need for
grazing on public land based on the forage needs of large herds of livestock
on lands with sparse forage, especially given the limited size of “homesteads”
that ranchers could obtain in fee under federal land disposal policies.250 For
several reasons, however, the analogy between prior appropriation in water
law and forage, and the resulting implications for property rights, is inapt.
First, even when unreserved federal lands remained open, the
247
See Public Rangeland Management I, supra note 17, at 548-50; Public Rangeland
Management II, supra note 39, at 23-24, 27-29; Donahue, supra note 11, at 729-40; Stimpert,
supra note 15, at 492;.
248
Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 326-27 (1890).
249
Public Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728, 731-33 (2000) (regarding lands
withdrawn pursuant to the Taylor Grazing Act); Light v. U.S., 220 U.S. 523, 524-25, 535
(1911) (regarding lands withdrawn for National Forest reserves).
250
See Light v. U.S., 220 U.S. 523, 535 (common law rule “was not adapted to the
situation of those states where there were great plains and vast tracts of uninclosed [sic] land,
suitable for pasture”); Buford, 133 U.S. at 228 (noting that common law rule regarding
grazing enclosures “was ill adapted to the nature and condition of the country at that time”);
Red Canyon Sheep Co. v. Ickes, 98 F.2d 308, 311 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (noting the “sparsity of
grass and forage in the region” as requiring large tracts to sustain livestock on the public
domain).
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Supreme Court recognized only an “implied license” to graze until Congress
prohibited it: “[T]here is an implied license, growing out of the custom of
nearly a hundred years, that the public land of the United States, especially
those in which the native grasses are adapted to the growth and fattening of
domestic animals, shall be free to the people who use them, where they are
left open and uninclosed [sic], and no act of government forbids its use.”251
Later cases affirmed that the United States merely “suffered” the use of public
lands for grazing through tacit acquiescence, and that such acquiescence was
revocable at will.252
Second, although natural law ideology might have persuaded
Congress to recognize property rights in public grazing, it chose not to do so.
Congress did not, in any statute analogous to the Desert Lands Act,253 sever
forage from public lands in the same way it did for water, or accept the
appropriation doctrine as to confer property rights. To the contrary, when
Congress enacted laws to govern federal land, it revoked the “implied
license” to graze254 and replaced it with grazing permits and leases issued by
federal land managers.255 In doing so, it provided expressly that grazing

251

Buford, 133 U.S. at 326; see also, Light, 220 U.S. at 535 (1911).
Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 352 (1918) (finding that the “government has
merely suffered the lands to be so used”); Light, 220 U.S. at 535 (1911) (finding only an
implied license to graze that did not “deprive the United States of the power of recalling”
that license); Osborne v. United States, 145 F.2d 892, 894-95 (9th Cir. 1944).
253
See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
254
See Chorunos v. United States, 193 F.2d 321, 323-24 (10th Cir. 1952) (rejecting
rancher claim to use of public land without a permit).
255
See Chorunos, 193 F.2d at 323 (10th Cir. 1951) (confirming discretionary nature of
252
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permits convey no property rights in federal land.256
Courts have confirmed that grazing permits convey no legally
cognizable property rights, and are revocable at the discretion of the federal
government.257 Moreover, courts upheld plenary federal authority over public
rangelands under the Property Clause, first to prohibit physical enclosures
and other methods used by some ranchers to monopolize public range258 and
later to regulate grazing on federal lands to allocate forage resources and to
protect other resources.259

permit system under Taylor Grazing Act). Others describe the mechanics of those regulations
in detail. See, e.g., Hillary M. Hoffmann, A Changing of the Cattle Guard: The Bureau of
Land Management’s New Approach to Grazing Qualifications, 24 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 243,
250-80 (2009); Feller, supra note 39, at 563-83; The Law of Public Rangeland Management
II, supra note 39, at 48-100.
256
43 U.S.C. §315b (“So far as consistent with the purposes and provisions of this
subchapter, grazing privileges recognized and acknowledged shall be adequately
safeguarded, but the creation of a grazing district or the issuance of a permit pursuant to the
provisions of this subchapter shall not create any right, title, interest, or estate in or to the
lands.”).
257
See United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 493-94 (1973); United States v. Estate of
Hage, 810 F.3d 712, 716 (9th Cir. 2016); Federal Lands Legal Consortium v. United States,
195 F.3d 1190, 1196 (10th Cir. 1999) (modification of grazing permits did not deny
procedural due process because grazing permits confer no property interest); Diamond Ring
Ranch, Inc. v. Morton, 531 F.2d 1397, 1404 (10th Cir. 1976); Chorunos, 193 F.2d at 323 (a
“livestock owner does not have the right to take matters into his own hands and graze public
lands without a permit”); United States v. Cox, 190 F.2d 293, 295-97 (10th Cir. 1951). But
see Red Canyon Sheep Co. v. Ickes, 98 F.2d 308, 315-16 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (although grazing
permits convey no vested property rights, they are of sufficient value to warrant equitable
protection in proper circumstances); Shufflebarger v. Commissioner, T.C. 980, 992 (1955)
(IRS decision that grazing preference is property for tax purposes).
258
See McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353, 359 (1922) (upholding conviction for
using force to prevent passage over federal lands); Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518,
525-26 (1897) (upholding federal statute prohibiting fences and other enclosures that restrict
public land access). Even before Congress adopted the Unlawful Enclosures Act, the
Supreme Court rejected efforts by some ranchers to obtain monopoly control over public
range resources, effectively rejecting a “rule of capture” theory of public land use and
ownership acquisition. Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 325-26 (1888).
259
See Public Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728, 739-44 (2000) (upholding BLM
regulations limiting grazing); Diamond Ring Ranch, 531 F.2d at 1401-04 (upholding federal
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Ironically, both opponents260 and proponents261 of property rights to
graze public lands agree that the unregulated implied license to graze
recognized in Buford was not sustainable. With dramatically expanding
grazing intensity in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, laissez faire
policy caused widespread deterioration of public rangelands and related
environmental problems, and livestock industry instability due to the
resulting uncertainty about grazing rights.262 In short, the public commons
approach to federal land263 management led to a tragedy of the commons.264
During the Dust Bowl, ranchers were among the most ardent proponents of
public range reform and allocated grazing.265 Regardless of how one reads
the history, Congress made a positive policy choice to regulate public land
use. Natural law ranch advocates remain free to advocate for change in that
positive law, but they have not prevailed in those policy arguments.
In the face of this positive law, the only claim available to natural law
ranch advocates is that natural law obligated the federal government to

authority to suspend or revoke grazing permit due to violations of regulations and permit
conditions).
260
See The Law of Public Rangeland Management II, supra note 39, at 31-32; Feller,
supra note 39, at 560-63; Donahue, supra note 11, at 724-28
261
See Harbison, supra note 43, at 468-69; Nelson, supra note 213, at 659-62; Stimpert,
supra note 15, at 488-94.
262
See Public Lands Council, 529 U.S. at 731-33.
263
See Buford, 133 U.S. at 227 (referring to the public range as a “public common”).
264
See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968).
265
See The Law of Public Rangeland Management II, supra note 39, at 42-47 (tracing
legislative history of Taylor Grazing Act and evolution of ranchers’ position from seeking
transfer of exclusive rights to acceptance of regulatory regime).
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recognize property rights to graze in ranchers who labored to put federal land
to beneficial use during the open access period. As discussed earlier,
however, the U.S. Constitution is the supreme law of the land.266 Although
judges might rely on natural law to decide common law cases not otherwise
addressed by positive law, to interpret constitutional ambiguities, or to apply
principles of equity, natural law cannot supplant binding positive law. The
only possible contrary arguments are that natural law sheds light on unenumerated rights preserved by the Ninth Amendment,267 or that property
rights to graze are fundamental liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.268 Even if one believes in the viability of natural law in
establishing constitutional rights, however, the argument is weak here.
The strongest potential support for the natural law argument is Justice
Brewer’s statement in Broder v. Natoma Mining that congressional
acceptance of prior appropriation reflected “a voluntary recognition of a preexisting right of possession, constituting a valid claim to its continued use,
than the establishment of a new one.”269 Given that Justice Brewer cited this
rationale to explain statutory recognition of those rights, that statement is
dictum at best. It was also consistent with the prevailing judicial method to

266

See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 176 - 178 and accompanying text.
268
See supra notes 153 - 155 and accompanying text.
269
Broder v. Natoma Water & Mining Company, 101 U.S. 274, 276; see supra note 208
and accompanying text.
267
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bolster positive law rulings with natural law reasoning.270 More importantly,
however, later statutes and judicial decisions, including the majority opinion
by Justice Sutherland in California Oregon Power, established that Congress
severed water rights from the public domain under its positive law authority
in the Property Clause.271 Moreover, the federal government affirmatively
reserved to the states the beds and the banks of navigable waters, but not other
federal lands.272
The second possible basis for property rights claims to federal grazing
resources, analogous to that in Griswold and progeny, is that appropriative
property rights arise out of other rights protected by the Constitution, or a
“penumbra” emanating from those rights, under pre-existing natural law
rights and principles encompassed by the Ninth Amendment.273 Even without
trying to resolve “the Griswold problem,”274 this argument is weak because
it is difficult to find even the penumbra underlying such a right. The Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the federal and state governments,
respectively, from taking private property without due process and just
compensation.275 Those protections, however, apply only to property

270

See supra notes 140 - 142 and accompanying text.
See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
272
Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 230 (1845).
273
See supra notes 176 - 178 and accompanying text.
274
See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
275
U.S. CONST. am. V, am. XIV, §1.
271
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recognized by positive law.276 Those provisions do not dictate what property
rights states or the federal government must recognize, and the Supreme
Court has rejected the idea that the “right” to graze on federal land is the kind
of property subject to Fifth Amendment protection.277 Even in the context of
appropriative water rights, which are usufructuary rather than fee in nature,278
courts have struggled with the degree to which those rights are entitled to
takings protections.279
Moreover, the positive law in the Constitution dictates that Congress
has plenary authority to “dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States.”280 The Supreme Court has held that the federal government
holds that land in trust for all citizens, and that the courts have no authority

276
See Melvyn R. Durchslag, Forgotten Federalism: The Takings Clause and Local
Land Use Decisions, 59 MD. L. REV. 464, 494 (2000) (asserting “[p]roperty…owes both its
existence and its contours to positive law, local positive law. Property simply does not exist
in the absence of state law,” and distinguishing property from individual liberty and racial
equality, which are “independent of legal facts”); Frank I. Micheleman, Property,
Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas and Judicial Conservatism, 35 Wm.
& Mary L. Rev. 301, 305 (1993) (arguing that liberty is an intuitive concept and a
“naturalistic” rather than “positivistic” norm, while “property cannot stand while the laws
fall”); Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114
YALE L.J. 203, 222 (2004) (arguing that the definition of property rights has generally been
left to the states, and “if state law did not create property in the first instance, then subsequent
state action cannot take property.”).
277
U.S. v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 493 (1973).
278
See ADLER, CRAIG AND HALL, supra note 37, at 1, 154.
279
Compare Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. U.S., 102 Fed. Cl. 443 (Fed. Cl. 2011)
(affirming that appropriative water rights are subject to Fifth Amendment protection, but
scrutinizing the exact nature of the usufructuary property right to determine that no taking
occurred) with Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. U.S., 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (Fed. Cl.
2001) (finding that restrictions on water used imposed under the Endangered Species Act
constituted a physical taking requiring just compensation).
280
U.S. CONST. art. IV, §3, cl. 2.
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to question policy decisions by the elected branches about the appropriate use
and disposition of lands subject to that trust.281 Thus, the Property Clause
created a far different vision of how public lands would be held in this
country, and for what purposes, relative to Crown lands in England.282
2.

Relevance of natural law

A second response to the prior appropriation analogy is that natural
law—even if applicable to grazing—does not support the claims of natural
law ranch advocates. First, prior appropriation may more properly reflect
positive law than natural law. Second, there is a compelling argument that
natural law applies differently to forage than to water. Because natural law
has evolved and been interpreted according to current societal needs and
conditions,283 any application of natural law must reflect the needs and
interests of the American public with respect to public lands held in trust for
all of them.
a.

Applicability of natural law

Justices Field and Miller justified prior appropriation in Lockean
natural law terms.284 Professor Donahue discussed water law (as well as
mining law and timber law) as a manifestation of the rule of capture.285 Her

281

Light v. U.S., 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911).
See id. at 536 (noting that the United States does not hold property for private
purposes, as might a monarch, quoting Van Brocklin v. Anderson, 117 U.S. 158 (1886)).
283
See supra Part II.D.
284
See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
285
See Donahue, supra note 11, at 731-33.
282
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counterpart Marc Stimpert agreed, but argued that the same principles should
apply to forage resources.286 Professor Richard Epstein, however, has
suggested the opposite interpretation, that the natural flow doctrine of
riparian rights287 reflected natural law, 288 while the reasonable use variation
of riparian rights and prior appropriation are examples of positive law,
created judicially and legislatively to address different economic,
environmental and other circumstances.289
Under Epstein’s view of natural law as predating the state and
reflecting “pre-political” rights and duties, water sources were res
commune:290 “Take a plot of land and it is yours. Stick a cup in the river, and
the water you have drawn out is yours as well.”291 The pre-political rule
allowed usufructuary water rights so long as intensity of use did not deplete
the stream value for common purposes such as navigation, recreation, and
fishing.292 This fits squarely within Locke’s theory of property. The labor
needed to withdraw water from its source, combined with the water, gives

286

See Stimpert, supra note 15, at 488, 518.
See ADLER, CRAIG AND HALL, supra note 37, at 46-47 for an explanation of the
evolution of riparian rights from natural flow to reasonable use doctrine.
288
See Epstein, supra note 69, at 2350-52.
289
See id. at 2356-59.
290
Referring to resources not owned by any individual but owned in common, as
distinguished from res nullius resources that are not held in common, but owned by no one
until reduced to individual ownership via occupation or capture. See id. at 2344.
291
Id. at 2350.
292
Id. at 2351. A “usufructuary” property right allows use but not full ownership or
occupation, for example, the right to pick and eat fruit but not to “own” the tree. See id. at
2345. In the context of usufructuary rights, a subtler distinction is that a water source is res
commune, while discrete amounts of water within that source are res nullius.
287
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rise to usufructuary riparian property rights.293 Yet Locke also admonished
that this right extends only to as much as any person needs, not so far as to
injure common rights to benefit from the same resource.294
Under this theory, natural law riparian rights worked well in a preindustrial world with low population density and low-intensity water uses.
Professor Epstein argues that intensified water uses, in an industrializing
world with larger and denser populations, required modification of riparian
doctrine via positive law (through common law decisions295 or legislation and
regulation296) to the “reasonable use” variation of riparian rights. Natural
flow doctrine required no state intervention because water use was limited to
riparian land ownership; hence the rule was self-executing or enforceable by
custom.297 Reasonable use doctrine required state action—via adjudication or
regulation—to determine what uses were reasonable, where, and in what
amounts. Likewise, Epstein identifies prior appropriation as a positive law
response to the poor fit between riparian doctrine and the geographic and

293

See LOCKE, supra note 75, Book II, ch. 5, §§ 27, 28.
See id., §§ 31, 33. A strict libertarian analysis struggles with the extent to which
individual appropriation of a common resource increases that individual’s liberty at the
expense of the liberty of others to use the same resource. See NOZICK, supra note 69, at 17482.
295
See generally, ADLER, CRAIG AND HALL, supra note 37, at 46-47 (explaining the
common law shift from natural flow to reasonable use doctrine).
296
See generally, id. at 243–54 (explaining the shift to “regulated riparianism”).
297
This part of Epstein’s claim may be overstated, because judicial intervention may be
needed if a riparian claims another user interfered with plaintiff’s use. See, e.g., Adams v.
Greenwich Water Co., 138 Conn. 205, 83 A.2d 177 (Conn. 1951) (suit to enjoin city from
taking water in amounts that interfered with plaintiffs’ riparian water rights).
294
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hydrological conditions of the west, with its aridity and large distances
between rivers.298
Prior appropriation, however, can also be explained as natural law.
Professor Epstein delineates natural law as one in which “emergent customs
and practices in the state of nature cannot be treated as a consequence of
conscious deliberation and supervision by the state.”299 Early prior
appropriation judicial decisions relied on customary practices that evolved,
absent formal state action, to allocate a scarce resource among competing
users, and on rights that pre-dated formal legal creation.300 Justice Field and
others indicated that appropriative water rights derive from Locke’s theory
of property and other natural law principles.301
Perhaps Justice Field and colleagues were simply wrong. They
operated in a period dominated by natural law, and habitually justified the
results they found appropriate through natural law reasoning. If Professor
Epstein is correct, those jurists incorrectly explained prior appropriation by
reference to natural law, when in fact they were exercising positive law
judicial authority, or interpreting positive statutory law, to replace the natural

298
See supra Part III.A.1 (describing early prior appropriation decisions); Epstein, supra
note 69, at 2359-60.
299
Id. at 2343.
300
See note 69 supra an accompanying text. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to
describe the informal mining camps as a primitive form of government, but that logic would
eliminate any nascent “society” as a source of natural law.
301
See note 284 supra and accompanying text.
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law doctrine of riparian rights to suit new circumstances. If so, it would
eliminate the legitimacy of the argument that natural law justifies equal
treatment of grazing and other public resources, that is, that appropriation of
those resources similarly generated a “pre-existing right” that courts must
uphold and protect. The federal government, exercising positive law
authority under the Property Clause, made different policy decisions that best
effectuated the public trust in public lands.
b.

Application of natural law

A second possible explanation is equally fatal to the argument that
natural law obligates the federal government to recognize appropriative rights
to forage. If both the riparian rights and prior appropriation can be explained
by natural law, there is no “universal” principle of natural law relevant to this
issue, equally appropriate to all human societies and contexts, based on a
single prototype of pre-political human existence. The “natural” interaction
of humans with the environment, and therefore the customary, pre-political
modes of resource allocation predating formal legal recognition through
positive law, vary based on different environmental circumstances. This is
consistent with the principle identified in Part II that natural law has not been
interpreted and applied uniformly over time. Rather, through positive law,
different polities adopted differing applications of natural law to suit
particular conditions.
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Indeed, the concepts of res nullius, res commune, and res publica
developed as societies evolved from pre-political to political to distinguish
between land and other resources held in common, but for different purposes.
Res nullius refers to property not owned by anyone,302 and therefore available
to individuals to reduce to private ownership (res privata) through labor. This
could apply to homesteading of unused land,303 capture of wildlife,304 or
mining of hard rock minerals. Res commune applies to resources owned
commonly for mutual benefit, such as a river under the natural flow doctrine
of riparian rights, which individuals may use for specific purposes so long as
they do not harm the res for use by others and the public at large. That made
sense for rivers, from which water might beneficially be used (for drinking,
watering crops and livestock, or running a mill), but where sufficient amounts
must remain to support public navigation and fisheries. Res publica refers to
resources intended for use by all, such as a public square, park, or commons.
All are consistent with the evolution of property from a pre-political to a
political world, in which different resources fit within each category, and
different societies may decide how to allocate resources through different
systems of positive law.

302

See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 399 (1948) (explaining principle of res nullius
in the context of wild animals (ferae naturae);
303
See Scott v. Powell, 182 F.2d 75, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (explaining that land can never
be res nullius, except for pre-societal or undiscovered land).
304
See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 178-79 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
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That is exactly how the federal government, through positive law,
adopted a different policy for water than for other resources. Although it is
not essential to this analysis whether one agrees with those federal policy
decisions, the distinctions are logical. Given the mobility of water and the
fact that state law governed water use elsewhere in the state, it was logical
for Congress to sever water from pubic lands so that all water could be
managed through an integrated legal system, rather than recognizing one
form of water rights on federal land and another on private land.305 The
federal government protected its interests in waterways by retaining
ownership of the beds and banks of non-navigable waterways on federal
land,306 and through the federal navigational servitude on navigable waters—
a doctrine that protects the res commune in those waterways.307
The federal government’s decision to retain fee ownership in large
tracts of public land reflected an equally rational decision that they were best
managed as res commune because they are valuable to different people for
different uses at various times and places,308 or in some cases, as res publica

305

The limited exception, noted above, is the federal reserved water doctrine. See supra
note 246 and accompanying text.
306
See PPL Montana, LLC, v. Montana, 56 U.S. 576, 591 (2012) (confirming that the
United States retains title to lands beneath non-navigable waters).
307
See U.S. v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 63 (1913) (“All
navigable waters are under the control of the United States for the purpose of regulating and
improving navigation, and although the title to the shore and submerged soil is in the various
states and individual owners under them, it is always subject to the servitude in respect of
navigation created in favor of the Federal Government by the Constitution.”).
308
Under the same logic, other public lands users could assert property interests because
they reaped public land values through labor, such as hiking. See Harbison, supra note 43,
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under particular statutory authority.309 BLM manages most of those lands for
multiple use pursuant to the Federal Land Policy and Management Act,310 but
since 1934 they have continued to be available to ranchers for public forage
under the Taylor Grazing Act, with preferences to ranchers with adjacent base
property, water rights, prior use and other factors.
IV.

CONCLUSION
A.

Refuting the Prior Appropriation Analogy

Despite its facial appeal, reliance on natural law to support political
agendas, in the western public lands debate or otherwise, is misplaced and
potentially dangerous. It ignores the history of U.S. jurisprudence and
foundational principles of republican democracy.
The simple response to the prior appropriation analogy is that, to the
extent that natural law drove the evolution of the prior appropriation doctrine
in mid-nineteenth century water law, it occurred in the absence of positive
law governing allocation of water. Through subsequent legislation or
adjudication, all western states adopted various versions of appropriative
water rights into their positive law, and the federal government expressly
ratified state authority to do so.311

at 459-63.
309
Congress can set aside federal land as a National Park, 54 U.S.C. § 100101, a National
Forest, 16 U.S.C. § 473, a National Wildlife Refuge, 16 U.S.C. § 688dd, or a wilderness area,
16 U.S.C. § 1131. The President may reserve National Monuments, 54 U.S.C. § 320301.
310
43 U.S.C. § 1731.
311
See supra Part II.A.
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Although similar natural law principles may have been applied to
grazing rights, the federal government made different policy choices in
positive laws governing those resources, consistent with the needs and
conditions of the United States and its citizenry. Most notably, in the Taylor
Grazing Act,312 Congress in 1934 rejected the appropriation doctrine in favor
of a permit system governing public grazing resources.
A prior appropriation approach to grazing can prevail only if those
positive law enactments are superseded by principles of natural law, which is
exactly what the Malheur defendants suggested in their assertion of “Godgiven rights.” The predominant interpretation of U.S. legal history, however,
is that positive law has supplanted natural law as the means by which we
establish legal rights and obligations. To the extent that courts can review
positive law established by lower courts or legislatures, the federal and state
constitutions become the standard against which legitimacy is judged, not
abstract principles of natural law.
Even if one accepts the continuing relevance of natural law, that
doctrine itself does not support the right of individuals to declare their own
interpretation of natural law, leaving them free to disobey positive law.
Positive law is the means by which societies establish binding rules, whether
or not those rules are influenced by natural law. That is the most fundamental

312

TAYLOR GRAZING ACT OF 1934, 43 U.S.C. ch. 8a §315 et seq. (1934).

78

Natural Law and Public Resources

[15-Feb-18

foundation on which civil society rests. If individuals or groups wish to
change prevailing positive law, they must do so through lawful means, in the
United States through the democratic and legal institutions established in the
federal and state constitutions. Although there is a longstanding tradition of
using civil disobedience to challenge existing positive law when lawful
means of law reform fail, proponents of that strategy must accept the legal
consequences of their actions. Otherwise, their reliance on natural law
promotes anarchy rather than law.
B. The Public Trust Analogy
For those who prefer a more protective approach to public land
management, the view that positive law has replaced natural law presents a
similar dilemma. Some pro-environment scholars have argued for an inherent
right to a clean environment,313 or to fundamental rights to clean water314 and
other essential environmental resources. Most notably, the classic statement
of the public trust doctrine sounds in the language of natural law.315 Public

313

See, e.g., James R. May, Symposium on Global Environmental Constitutionalism:
Introduction and Overview, 21 Widener L. Rev. 139, 140 (2015); Erin Daly, Environmental
Human Rights: Paradigm of Indivisibility, (Widener Law Sch. Legal Res. Stud. Paper no.
11:05), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1743610.
314
See, e.g., David Zetland, Water Rights and Human Rights, The Poor Will Not Need
Our Charity if We Need Their Water, JOHN HOPKINS WATER MAGAZINE, July 2010,
http://water.jhu.edu/index.php/magazine/water-rights-and-human-rights-the-poor-will-notneed-our-charity-if-we-need/; David Zetland, Water Rights and Human Rights, FORBES
(Mar. 25 2010, 10:00AM) https://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0412/opinions-sanitationhaiti-human-rights-on-my-mind.html; Jernar Letnar Černič, Corporate Obligations under
the Human Right to Water, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L & POLY. 303, 310-15 (2011).
315
“By the law of nature these things are common to mankind—the air, running water,
the sea and consequently the shores of the sea.” J. INST 2.1.1. Although codification of the
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trust principles have been invoked to modify prior appropriation rights
established by positive law,316 and to support protection of a range of
environmental resources beyond the original contours of the doctrine.317
Conservative scholars have sought to restrict the public trust doctrine to its
original contours in American or English positive law.318
Unless the public trust doctrine has a constitutional underpinning or

public trust doctrine might suggest positive law notwithstanding the reference to “the law of
nature,” the Institutes were simply a codification of those principles of law that had been
assembled by Roman legal scholars near the end of the Roman Empire, regardless of their
legal origins. See Ewa M. Davison, Enjoys Long Walks on the Beach: Washington’s Public
Trust Doctrine and the Right of Pedestrian Passage Over Private Tidelands 81 Wash. L.
Rev. 813, 813 (2006). But see, Richard A. Epstein, How Spontaneous? How Regulated? The
Evolution of Property Rights Systems, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2341, 2343 (2015) (arguing that the
public trust doctrine has been mischaracterized as being grounded in this Justinian source).
316
National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 734
(Cal. 1983) (holding that California prior appropriation law embodied in the state
constitution and state statute must be balanced against principles derived from the public
trust doctrine).
317
See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm & Thea Schwartz, Mono Lake and the Evolving Public
Trust in Western Water, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 701 (1995) (explaining the expansion of the
doctrine to address water allocation and quantity); Jack H. Archer & Terance W. Stone, The
Interaction of the Public Trust and the “Takings” Doctrines: Protecting Wetlands and
Critical Coastal Areas, 20 VT. L. REV. 81 (1995) (arguing for the use of the doctrine to
protect wetlands); Anna R.C. Casperson, Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine and the
Impossibility of “Takings” by Wildlife, 23 B.C. ENVT’L. AFF. L. REV. 357 (1996) (suggesting
applicability of the doctrine to protect wildlife); Ralph W. Johnson, Water Pollution and the
Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENVT’L L. 485 (1989) (proposing use of the doctrine to protect
water quality); Ralph W. Johnson & William G. Galloway, Protection of Biodiversity Under
the Public Trust Doctrine, 8 TULANE ENVT’L L. J. 21 (1994) (discussing utility of the doctrine
to protect biodiversity); John C. Dernbach, Taking the Pennsylvania Constitution Seriously
When It Protects the Environment: Part II-Environmental Rights and Public Trust, 104
DICK. L. REV. 97 (1999) (arguing that the public trust doctrine supports protection of
Pennsylvania’s Environmental resources, citing Pa. Const. art. I, § 27). Most recently,
environmentalists have advocated a public atmospheric trust to combat climate change, with
mixed judicial reactions. See Juliana v. U.S., 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016), motion to
certify appeal denied, No. 6:15-CV-01517-TC, 2017 WL 2483705 (D. Or. June 8, 2017);
Butler ex rel. Peshlakai v. Brewer, 2013 WL 1091209 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) (assuming but
not deciding the public trust doctrine extends to the atmosphere, but dismissing on other
grounds).
318
See, e.g., James L. Huffman, Why Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine is Bad for the
Public, 45 ENVTL. L. 337, 357 (2015).
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other source in positive law, consistency requires proponents of those
protections to accept that natural law might support appropriative rights to
the public domain, or to explain why those assertions constitute an incorrect
application of natural law. This apparent inconsistency will be the subject of
a companion article.

